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내가 나의 작은 아름다운 가족에게 [우리 
남영 과 토마스 ] 이 논문을 바칩니다.1
                                                          
1
 I dedicate this thesis to my family [Nicole and Thomas]. 
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ABSTRACT 
The World‘s fisheries are in a desperate state, they have been utilised to a point where a majority of the fisheries 
resources are fully exploited. In addition to overfishing, the responsibility of the sad state of affairs of the world‘s 
High Seas‘ fish stocks can be put down to inefficient management. The high seas fisheries regime is dominated by 
two powerful, tried, tested and consented to norms: the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas and the principle of 
exclusive flag state jurisdiction over flagged vessels on the high seas. These Grotius norms (unintentionally) obstruct effective 
and meaningful high seas fisheries management, and have enabled unscrupulous states and actors to take advantage 
of the lacunae created by the UNCLOS High Seas fisheries framework and engage in IUU fishing which has 
resulted in a tragedy of the high seas commons. Furthermore these norms have a ‗hobbling‘ effect on RFMOS and 
coastal states alike, and leave them almost powerless to ensure flag-state compliance with their sustainable fishing 
measures without the consent of the flag state, and totally unable to enforce its measures directly on that flagged 
vessel. Thus in the absence of an express reference to the superiority of coastal state rights over those of high seas 
fishing states, freedom of high seas fishing prevails. However the international community armed with weaker 
UNCLOS obligations of conservation and co-operation and have fought the good fight, and in lightening speed 
have constructed a normative framework that is additional to but consistent and complimentary with the UNCLOS 
regime. With the use of port state measures, voluntary instruments that codify responsible fisheries practice, 
surveillance and the denial of the right to land IUU fish – the fight is gradually beginning to turn in favour of the 
international community. 
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Hutia te rito o te harakeke.  
Kei hea te komako e ko? 
Ki mai nei ki ahau. He aha te mea nui ki tenei ao? 
Maku e ki atu. He tangata, he tangata, he tangata.2 
 
Traditional Maori Proverb 
 
                                                          
2
 ―If you were to pluck out the centre of the flax bush, where would the bellbird sing? 
If you were to ask me "What is the most important thing in the world?" I would reply, "That it is people, people, people."‖ 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally the oceans have been seen as a ―vast virtually inexhaustible commons‖ and are under 
significant stress from the pressures being ―exerted on ocean ecosystems through over fishing, pollution, and 
environmental and climate change.‖3  The World‘s fisheries are in a desperate state, they have been 
utilised to a point where a majority of the fisheries resources are fully exploited. According to a 
recent National Geographic Article; ―fishermen remove more than 170 billion pounds (or 77.9 million 
tonnes) of wildlife a year from the seas compared to 16.7 million tonnes of fish in 1950.‖4 According to Myers 
and Worm, in 2003 more than 90% of the world‘s large predatory fishes, such as tuna, swordfish 
and marlin have been lost to industrialised fishing.5 If we continue to harvest the world‘s oceans 
at this rate there will be a worldwide collapse of fisheries. Daniel Pauly solemnly wrote;6  
―Unfortunately, it is not just the future of the fishing industry that is at stake, but also the continued health of the 
world‘s largest ecosystem. While the climate crisis gathers front-page attention on a regular basis, people--even those who 
profess great environmental consciousness--continue to eat fish as if it were a sustainable practice [...] In the past 50 
years, we have reduced the populations of large commercial fish, such as bluefin tuna, cod, and other favourites, by a 
staggering 90 percent. One study, published in the prestigious journal Science, forecast that, by 2048, all commercial fish 
stocks will have ―collapsed,‖ meaning that they will be generating 10 percent or less of their peak catches. Whether or not 
that particular year, or even decade, is correct, one thing is clear: Fish are in dire peril, and, if they are, then so are we.‖ 
The picture is grim and with a few notable exceptions in places with well-managed fisheries; 
Alaska, Iceland and New Zealand, biodiversity [that is the number of different fish swimming 
the seas] is a fraction of that of a century ago. Furthermore, and what is more important to us 
here in New Zealand and our Pacific neighbours is ―with many northern hemisphere waters fished out, 
commercial fleets have steamed south, overexploiting once teeming fishing [southern] grounds.‖ 7  
To understand fishing on the high Seas it is crucial to understand how fishes are distributed in 
the ocean relative to areas that fall under coastal state jurisdiction and areas that are subject only 
to flag state jurisdiction [the high seas]. The generalisation that fish are not usually abundant in 
the areas of the high seas beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (―EEZ‖) (which is true for the 
bulk of the global fish catch) is not always valid.8 However what is known that is that many 
migratory species like Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus), Southern Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus maccoyii ) 
or Yellowfin Tuna (Thunnus albacores) are found in fishable quantities in waters beyond coastal 
state jurisdiction. Even though the FAO estimates that about 80% of fish landed are caught in 
waters that fall within coastal state jurisdiction, not all of these coastal states have effective 
control over their waters; Kiribati for instance has a colossal EEZ and only one patrol boat that 
                                                          
3 Marcus Haward & Joanna Vince; Oceans Governance in the Twenty-first Century: Managing the Blue Planet, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, UK. P 9. 
4 Paul Greenberg, ―Time for a Sea Change‖ National Geographic Magazine (October 2010) 78: 80-81. 
5
 R. A Myers and B. Worm, ―Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities‖ [2003] Nature 423: 280-
283. 
6  Daniel Pauly, ―Aquacalypse Now: The End of Fish‖ The New Republic (September 28, 2009).  
7
 Commonwealth Foundation, ―From Kilifi to Windhoek, Raising Awareness and Tackling Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) and Over-Fishing‖ [2008] Regional Fisheries Series, No.1, p 4 
8
 William T. Burke, ―Compatibility and Precaution in the 1995 Straddling Stock Agreement‖ in Harry N. Scheiber, 
Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Volume 34, 
2000) pp105-126, 107. 
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often lacks fuel.9 Furthermore many coastal states fail to exercise effective management of 
fishstocks in their jurisdictional waters, with over capitalisation, fishing subsidies, overfishing and 
excessive bycatch [especially of straddling stocks and highly migratory species] that undermines 
the sustainable management practice of neighbouring states.  
 
This unsatisfactory jurisdictional situation has resulted in ‗enormous economic loss, on top of 
stock reductions that has resulted in the closure of significant traditional fisheries.‘10 Add to this 
situation the highly mechanised fishing fleets of some distant water fishing nations (―DWFNs‖) 
who have the capacity to stay and sea for months at a time, and to fish enormous quantities 
literally parked just off the boundaries of well managed EEZs harvesting straddling and highly 
migratory fish that have the habit of straying beyond the man-made EEZ boundary.11 However 
any attempt at regulating fishing beyond EEZ boundaries must not only take into account the 
nutritional and economic aspects of the fishing states, but also the status of the high seas and the 
fish within, remaining common property, subject only to property rights when removed from the 
commons.12  
 
This inefficient unsustainable use of the commons is what Hardin in 1968 referred to as a 
tragedy.13 Gavouneli points out that;14 
―Indeed, exploitation in that setting does not simply denote the management of the resource but also, much more urgently, 
the preservation of that valuable commodity for the benefit of the present and future generations. In the decentralised 
system of the international community, any such law-making exercise instantly requires as additional element of difficulty 
and thus uncertainty – and immediately raises the question of proper and effective implementation.‖ 
In order to combat Hardin‘s tragedy of the commons, attempts were made by some costal states 
to extend coastal state jurisdiction beyond 200nm as stipulated by United Nations Convention 
on the Law of The Sea (―UNCLOS‖)15. This was met with fierce opposition16 – it is arguable that 
the reassertion of  high seas freedoms with respect to fisheries in UNCLOS could be considered 
                                                          
9
 Rachel Baird, ―Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, Economic and Historical 
Factors Relevant to its Developments and Persistence‖ (2004) MJIL 5(2): 299.  
10
 William T. Burke, ―Compatibility and Precaution in the 1995 Straddling Stock Agreement‖ in Harry N. Scheiber, 
Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Volume 34, 
2000) pp105-126, 108. 
11
  Malcolm Evans, International Law (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) p 680; Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case, (Spain v Canada), (Estai Case), 4 December 1998, (1998) ICJ Reports 432 – where rather than rely on RFMOs 
to encourage states to be compliant with fishery regimes ―Canada adopted a different approach by asserting its 
right to enforce its conservation and management measures over Greenland turbot (or halibut) over the Grand 
Banks in the Atlantic Ocean. Canada claimed that the Spanish Boat fished the banks illegally and undermined it 
conservation measures pursuant to 64-68 of UNCLOS and arrested the Spanish fishing vessel (the Estai) on the high 
seas – Spain (the EU) subsequently brought a case against Canada – which the Court was unable to consider.  See 
also Maria Gavouneli Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 
2007) p 97.  
12
 Maria Gavouneli Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 
2007) p 97; also see R.R. Churchill and A.V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd Edition. Juris Publishing, Manchester, UK. 
1999), p281. 
13
 Garrett Hardin, ―The Tragedy of the Commons‖ (1968) Science, 162:1243-1248. 
14
 Maria Gavouneli Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 
2007) p 98. 
15
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 396; 21 I.L.M 
1245 (1982). 
16
 Malcolm Evans, International Law (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) p 680. 
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as quid pro quo by non-coastal states for giving up their rights to the waters that have since 
become EEZs which is also in accordance with UNCLOS. DWFNs were adamant that they 
would not give their right to fish the high seas freely and the right to exclusive jurisdiction over 
their flagged vessels that were doing the fishing. Therein lies the difficulty in codifying and 
developing an international high seas fisheries regime and instituting high seas governance. 
How can we deal with our colossal taste for sea food? What‘s the next step in reducing our 
global SeafoodPrint? Dr. Pauly and Enric Sala say that a global treaty with seafood-consumption 
targets would be a good start.17 However the problem is complicated and although it‘s common 
knowledge that there are simply too many boats are chasing too few fish, the problem of over-
fishing the high seas is inextricably linked to many other factors; centred on a game of cat and 
mouse between RFMOs18 and IUU fishers19 where the former has the functional jurisdiction to 
exercise governance in the absence of government, and the latter able to hide behind lacunae in 
that high seas governance framework.20   
IUU fishing not only has an impact on high Seas fishstocks it also has a ―direct impact on coastal 
communities and artisanal or subsistence fishermen whose livelihoods are at stake as a direct result of the global 
collapse in fish stocks.‖21 Furthermore there are significant drivers in addition to the lack of 
enforcement jurisdiction by RFMOs against boats engaged in IUU fishing, one significant driver 
is that ‗IUU fishing pays.‘ For example one large sushi-grade migrating trans-boundary fish like 
bluefin tuna can reach up to USD$300,000 on the Japanese market.22 The economic gain from 
such transactions is such that it is often within a fisher‘s best interests [even that of a state] to 
engage in IUU fishing. It is no surprise that scientific communities continue to file contradictory 
arguments and figures to RFMOs determining whether this is a small or a widespread shortage.23 
Yet RFMOs are under constant scrutiny and receive much criticism on their inability to manage 
global fisheries – some commentators emotively accuse RFMOs of deliberately mismanaging 
fishstocks or being incompetent; 24 
―Astonishingly, […] some Regional Fisheries Management Organisations eg, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
continue to think that fish stocks are unlimited and that our oceans will be able to cope with an exploding world 
population. A fatal error indeed…‖25 
RFMOs by exercising a governance function have overtime become the primary mechanism by 
which the high seas are regulated. This is no easy feat in the absence of government – that is as 
sub-regional or regional fisheries organisations that in accordance with UNCLOS have the 
functional jurisdiction to regulate high seas fisheries but lack any of the hard jurisdictions by 
                                                          
17 The Beacon, ―New Study Measures Nations ‗SeafoodPrint‘‖ The Beacon (Blog), (Posted Wed, Sep 22, 2010). 
18
 Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (―RFMOs‖).  
19
 Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (―IUU‖). 
20
 Commonwealth Foundation, ―From Kilifi to Windhoek, Raising Awareness and Tackling Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) and Over-Fishing‖ [2008] Regional Fisheries Series, No.1, p 4. 
21
 Ibid, p 5. 
22
 Ben McIntyre, ―The fish that‘s too tasty to live‖(Wednesday, August 4, 2010) The Dominion Post, B5. 
23
 P.A Nickler, ―A Tragedy of the Commons for Coastal Fisheries: Contending Prescriptions for Conservation, and 
the Case for the Atlantic Blue Fin Tuna (1998-1999) B.C. Environmental Affairs Review, 26; 555. 
24 Commonwealth Foundation, ―From Kilifi to Windhoek, Raising Awareness and Tackling Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) and Over-Fishing‖ [2008] Regional Fisheries Series No.1.  
25 Ibid.  
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which to promote compliance with sustainable measures and regulations, obviate inconsistent 
flag state policies, or even enforce high seas fishing regulations in the face of flag states who 
thumb their noses at RFMO conservation measures.26 Furthermore the job of the RFMOs is 
made more challenging still by having been forced to rely on flag states to enforce compliance of 
vessels flying their flags on the high seas due to the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction.27 
RFMOs such as CCAMLR, 28struggle to control over-exploitation of certain species of fish 
because of non-cooperation by some nationals of its member states.29 And what of non-
members and DWFNs who are able to fish without prejudice on the high seas that hide behind 
the principle of freedom of fishing?30 And then there are the irresponsible fishers of RFMO 
member-states who‘s States do comply with RFMO measures, who simply in order to 
circumvent the whole sustainable management process re-register their vessels to non-member 
states who have open registries and fish the high seas again with impunity, in accordance with 
UNCLOS flying a flag of convenience.31 
 
This dissertation will assess the ability of Individual States and RFMOs to manage high seas 
fisheries, in the face of a high seas normative framework that not only limits the RFMO toolbox, 
but arguably exercises an adverse impact on any meaningful high seas resource management. In 
order to illustrate the nature and strength of this negatively impacting normative framework it is 
necessary to charter the course of high seas management historically and normatively, and 
address how these norms not only came about, but how they enable or impede the high seas 
governance strategies and mechanisms of RFMOs and of sustainably minded states. Although 
RFMOs are very much a subject of this dissertation, assessing the nature of the RFMOs toolbox, 
and the actual performance of RFMOs themselves is not part of this study. Rather, this study 
will critically assess various strategies and initiatives implemented by interested states alike in 
response to an apparent inability for RFMOs and interested states to mitigate the tragedy of the 
commons to deter or even eliminate IUU fishing. 
 
Chapter two deals with the Law of the Sea as an international customary normative framework 
underpinned by strong Roman law doctrines of res nullius and res communis and the history of their 
implementation by States, as the nature of their interaction with other states with respect to 
fisheries changes. This chapter will concentrate on the application of the prevailing norms by 
two 16th century legal theorists; Grotius (from Holland an emerging naval power) and Selden 
(from Britain the dominant naval power), who each took a conflicting position applying the 
Roman principle that best suited their national conception of the high seas.  
                                                          
26
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 396; 21 I.L.M 
1245 (1982), Articles 64-67 & 117-120. 
27
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 396; 21 I.L.M 
1245 (1982), Articles 89, 92 and 94. 
28
 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
29
 A. Broadhurst, ―The Long Hook of High Seas Fisheries Management: Use of the Nationality Base of Jurisdiction 
to Combat IUU Fishing in the CCAMLR Area‖ (LLM Thesis, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 19th 
February 2002) p 5. 
30
 Above at n. 27, Articles 87 & 116. 
31
 Camile Goodman, ―The Regime for Flag State Responsibility in International Fisheries law: Effective Fact, 
Creative Fiction, or Further Work Required?‖(2009) A&NZ Maritime Law Journal 23: 157-169, 159-160. 
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Both acknowledged the problem of the susceptibility of the commons to overfishing if left 
unchecked (what Hardin32 came to call the tragedy of the commons). Interestingly Grotius, who 
advocated freedom, wrote; 
―…and if it were possible to prohibit…fishing, for in a way can be maintained that fishing is exhaustible, still it would 
not be possible to prohibit navigation, for the same is not exhausted by that use.‖  
Hardin‘s tragedy of the commons and other commentaries have established unequivocally the process 
by which resource users, left to individual choices, are driven to overuse any common resource. 
Dietz, Leal and Hsu and other commentators vehemently argue that regulation and the 
enforcement of compliance with those regulations is the only way to prevent the tragedy which 
Pauly terms ‗the End of Fish.‘33  
Chapter three will look at the Present UNCLOS regime as it regulates fishing on the high seas, 
and how it contrasts with waters that fall under the jurisdiction of a Coastal State, where the 
present law of the Sea framework allows for enforcement of sustainable management measures 
in waters that fall within coastal state jurisdiction, where increasingly the freedom of fishing is 
being replaced with limitations and transferable quotas that vest in fishermen property in the fish 
they catch;34 On the high seas it is a different story, UNCLOS guarantees not only freedom of 
fishing on the high seas35, but also exclusive flag state jurisdiction over the flag state‘s fishing 
boats on the high seas.36  
In the face of these two unequivocal customary norms, articles 117-120 of UNCLOS in 
comparison lay down a somewhat nebulous duty on interested states to co-operate in the 
management and conservation of high-seas fishery resources, making use, where appropriate, of 
international fishery commissions and RFMOs.37 UNCLOS fails to provide these regional 
institutions with robust provisions and the requisite tools required to enforce conservation and 
sustainable management measures and ensure compliance. Ironically, there are more robust 
provisions on the need for fishstocks management in the section of UNCLOS that deals with 
highly migratory and straddling fishstocks in the EEZ of a Coastal State.38 This seems rather 
pointless considering UNCLOS gives Coastal states both prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction over the water column and the fisheries resources that fall within their respective 
EEZs, which includes the freedom to manage the stocks. RFMOs however, in spite of the lack 
of tools continue to receive the brunt of the criticism for the despicable state of high seas 
fisheries.39 It is my contention that where a robust meaningful management regime is required – 
on the high seas – there is none. 
                                                          
32
 Garrett Hardin, ―The Tragedy of the Commons‖ (1968) Science, 162:1243-1248. 
33
 Daniel Pauly, ―Aquacalypse Now: The End of Fish‖ (September 28, 2009) The New Republic. 
34
 Donald R. Leal, ―Individual Fishing Quotas: Long Overdue‖ (June 25, 2002) The Oregonian; Donald R. Leal, 
―Homesteading the Oceans‖, (2000) PERC Reports: Volume 18, No. 3, 12-14. 
35
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 396, Art 87(e) 
36
 Ibid, Art 94 
37
 R.R. Churchill and A.V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd Edition. Juris Publishing, Manchester. UK. 1999) p282 [see 
UNCLOS art 119]. 
38
 Ibid, p288. 
39
 Sarika Cullis-Suzuki & Daniel Pauly, ―Evaluating Global Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: 
Methodology and Scoring‖ [2009] Working Paper #2009-12, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia 
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It is a central premise of this dissertation that the normative framework that forms the 
architecture of the high seas fisheries regime represents an obstacle to the management of the 
high seas fisheries. Therefore this chapter will also briefly canvas some of the factors that 
contributed to the regime representing a road block to international fisheries management – 
arguing that the positivist regime highlights constructive process over structural process, with 
outcomes that are path dependent and dominated by short term political agenda that have the 
tendency to satisfy domestic political-economic ends often at the expense of international ones.  
 
Chapter four takes a look at IUU fishing. Patrick Nickler, Daniel Pauly and Rachel Baird have all 
illustrated that not only is overfishing more often than not economically viable, it is often in a 
State‘s best interest to circumvent the rules, and overfish in the face of regulation. This provides 
us with a somewhat robust explanation as to why it has been so difficult for governments, 
communities, and other institutions to implement solutions to the commons dilemma, and why 
high seas fishing states have often been the most vociferous opponents to compulsory solutions 
and hard jurisdiction for RFMOs. Therefore it is essential to look at what drives IUU fishing, 
with the implication being that going to war against the drivers, may do more for eliminating 
IUU fishing than relying solely on RFMOs to make the rules and the flag state to enforce them 
which is the present mode d‘emploi. ―Tragedy may not be inevitable in the commons, but 
unhappily tragedy remains the predominant outcome.‖40  
Chapter five will acknowledge the political will by canvassing examples where interested parties 
(mostly coastal States) engaged in international co-operation to not only combat the IUU fishing, 
but also to work with RFMOs by providing them with the requisite additional tools to do the 
job. In addition to addressing the international principles that preclude enforcement of various 
measures passed to challenge the tragedy of the commons, it is necessary to outline the 
international hard law initiatives like the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement41 and the 1995 UN 
Fishstocks Agreement42; and other soft law initiatives like 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries43 & the 2001 FAO International Plan of Action on IUU fishing44; that 
have contributed to the RFMO arsenal. Yet even these instruments are unable to adequately 
combat the strength of the two customary norms central to the UNCLOS high Seas fishing 
regime, and therefore have had limited success guarding against High Seas fishstocks decimation 
and IUU fishing, due to the most part of the international doctrine of pacta tertiis which requires 
the consent to a state if it is to be bound by any international measure.45 
                                                          
40
 Barton H. Thompson Jnr, ―Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons‖ [2000] Working 
Paper No. 187, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, 1-54: 3. 
41
 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High 
Seas, FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) Rome, 24 November 1993, 33 ILM 968 
(1994) (―Compliance Agreement‖).  
42
 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec 4, 
1995, A/CONF.164/37, 8 September 1995, 34 ILM 1542. (―UNFSA or Fish Stocks Agreement‖). 
43
 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Rome, 1995 (―Code of 
Conduct‖). 
44
 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,FAO (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) Rome, 2001. (―IPOA-IUU‖). 
45
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Lastly this thesis will canvas the development of port state measures which are the new weapon 
in the war against plummeting fish stocks, the black marketeering of many highly migratory 
species and the decimation of marine ecosystems. Port states represent a multi-faceted approach 
to the combat IUU fishing operations, and proceeds on the premise that since IUU fishing is not 
solely a legal problem, so too should the solution not be wholly a legal one. IUU operations are 
underpinned by political, social and economic factors – and in order to control the practice those 
other factors also need to be addressed. Trade and Port State measures dis-incentivise 
engagement in IUU fishing by attacking the profitability of IUU fishing and establishing import 
and export controls or prohibitions, based on the robust jurisdictional powers of the port state 
over their own ports. PSM include the MCS, vessel listings or ‗Blacklisting‘, observer 
participation, vessel monitoring systems (VMS), and CDS, also the bolstering of import 
restrictions, strengthening civil and criminal penalties against illegal fishers, and the application of 
punitive trade sanctions against flag states who engage in IUU activities.46 
 
Port States measures have been becoming an increasingly important arsenal in the fight against 
overfishing and IUU fishing. Initially PSM were provided for as recommendations in the 1993 
Compliance Agreements, the UNFSA and 1995 Code of Conduct. In 2001 the IPOA-IUU 
provided various PSM in order to combat IUU vessel ‗flag-hopping‘ and IUU activities, in 
addition to the act of IUU fishing itself. As PSM are now included in a formal binding Port State 
measures Agreement (PSMA).47 The PSMA provides port state with robust powers to prevent 
illegally caught fish from entering international markets through their ports by having foreign 
vessels submit to searches, declare their arrival and arrive with the requisite documentation 
(CDS) – transgressors will be denied use of the port and access to that ports market.48 
 
This thesis will conclude that although the High Seas Fisheries regime is dominated by two 
powerful, tried, tested and consented norms that (unintentionally) obstruct effective and 
meaningful high seas fisheries management, and have enabled unscrupulous states and actors to 
take advantage of the lacunae, and engage in IUU fishing and that has resulted in a tragedy of the 
high seas commons – the international community armed with a weaker UNCLOS obligations 
of conservation and co-operation and have fought the good fight, and in lightening speed have 
constructed a normative framework that is additional to but consistent and complimentary with 
the UNCLOS regime. 
  
 
                                                          
46
 Benjamin Sovacool, ―A Game of Cat and Fish: How to Restore the Balance in Sustainable Fisheries 
Management‖ [2009] Ocean Development & International Law, 40: 97-125, p 98.  
47
 Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Annex E to the Report of the 
Technical Consultation to Review Port State Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
FAO Fisheries Report no. 759, FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) Rome, 2004; 
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II THE INTERNATIONAL COMMONS  
 
A A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
At the heart of the ‗bountiful‘ ocean is a paradox. The ocean is home to a significant slice of the 
Earth‘s natural resources – and these resources are locked up because they are located in the 
domain of what is ―traditionally acknowledged to be beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of 
sovereign states, or what are known as ‗international commons‘.‖49 Simply put, traditionally the 
Sea and its bounty is the property of everyone in common and at the same time the property of 
no-one in particular.  
This concept of the ‗Commons‘ is by no means a new concept; it is as ancient as it is 
problematic.  Arguably the status of the World‘s oceans as either property or commons has been 
a question since humankind first developed the requisite technology to cross the sea and catch its 
fish. Archaeological evidence shows that prehistoric humans engaged in fishing all over the 
world using primitive traps, nets tied from natural fibres, hooks, and harpoons.50 Since then 
fishing has developed somewhat, and with the advent of refrigerated super-trawlers, 
sophisticated netting systems and satellite spotting equipment, fishing on the High Seas has 
become just as intensive as it has extensive. Yet still, to this day the debate over whether or not 
the Seas are free continues.  
Historically conceptions of the status of the ocean and the resources within it varied as much as 
custom varied. Agreement based on the Law of Nations was very difficult to establish since 
different states had different interests and interpretations. In a New Zealand context the seminal 
case of Baldick v Jackson51 clarified and established the principles of both common and private 
property with respect to ‗fishes‘ in the sea. The parties in Baldick battled over a whale that 
Jackson allegedly caught and then abandoned, which was subsequently appropriated by Baldick. 
The judge, Justice Stout was from a Scottish whaling family and was well versed in the custom of 
whale ‗fishing‘. He was well aware that the contemporary New Zealand whaling custom had 
been imported from Scotland and England. Stout held that in order to have property in a ‗fish‘ 
one must first take it from the commons, capture it and reduce it to possession.52 This 
appropriation by reduction to possession requires intention to possess. Furthermore one must 
secure and exert control over the fish. Looking for a lost fish is exerting control over it.  
Otherwise the fish remains common property and open for appropriation. This he noted was 
different to some other fisheries, namely the Greenland fishery, where a caught and then lost 
whale, can be appropriated by someone else. This acknowledgement by the court in Baldick of 
the uneasy historic duopoly between that which is property and that which is common and the 
associated rights and obligations go hand in hand with them, have since been translated with just 
as much confusion and just as problematically into our present Law of the Sea regime. 
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According to Soroos, the confusion over the Status of the Ocean comes down to a battle 
between two conflicting prevailing international legal principles that although attributed for the 
most part to Grotius and Selden, have been around for more than two millennia.53 The first of 
the two conflicting principles is the principle of ―freedom of the seas‖, where the ―oceans are 
assumed to be open to all who desire to make use of them.‖54 Logically it follows then that no 
state can legally appropriate them for exclusive use. The second of the two conflicting principles 
is the principle of ―coastal state jurisdiction‖ where states ―may exercise jurisdiction over parts of 
the oceans and claim exclusive rights to the marine resources located within them.‖55 These two 
principles located centrally in the UNCLOS, trace their lineage to Roman law and two codified 
doctrines of jus gentium that applied to Commons; res nullius and res communis.56 
(i)  Grotius 
 
The western notion of freedom of the seas is traced back to Hugo Grotius who maintained in 
two treatises; Mare Liberum (1609) and De Jure Belliac Pacis (1625) that the Oceans can only be 
common property.57 This theory put forward by Grotius according to Knight ―came into the 
world somewhat like a bomb shell‖,58  especially when ―powerful‖ maritime countries like Spain, 
Portugal, Britain, Venice and Denmark-Norway all found the idea of a mare clausum- dominium 
maris attractive.‖59 According to Hugo Grotius‘s Mare Liberum, the seas must be free for 
navigation and fishing, because owning things that are obviously created by nature for common 
use by all is inconsistent with natural law.60 Grotius relied on the Thomist School thinkers to 
illustrate his thesis, as are reflected in the works of Vitoria, Suárez and also to an extent in 
Gentili.61 Both Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) are 
unmistakably legal naturalists; both believing that ―international law was founded on the 
universal law of nature, and that principles derived from nature bind states in their external 
relations‖62 On the other hand, Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), did not rely on theology and canon 
law to justify his position, despite his constant reference to natural law and the law of nations. To 
Gentili, international law was not the same as natural law. Consequently, from a ―perspective of 
reality‖ Gentili believed that ―every nation-State in reality had equal rights‖, and so ―attributed 
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the basis of international law to the practice of States, as reflected in their treaties, voluntary 
obligations, custom and history.‖63  
 
Grotius notion of the Law of the Sea stood somewhere in the middle between the naturalist 
Vitoria and Suarez and the positivist Gentili. Grotius acknowledged the positivist component of 
his International Law of the Sea by basing it on the ―common consent‖ of nation-States.64 
However Grotius position is clothed most noticeably in the natural law tradition. Grotius wrote; 
―For the principles of the law of nature, since they are always the same, [they] can easily be brought into a systematic 
form; but the elements of positive law, since they often undergo change and are different in different places, are outside the 
domain of systematic treatment, just as other notions of particular things are.‖ 
However one must bear in mind that Grotius although basing his Law of the Sea on sound 
principle, not only a national of an emerging maritime power, but was also writing on behalf of 
the Dutch East India Company who were challenging Portuguese restrictions on navigation in 
the Indian Ocean.65 Furthermore the state practice and conceptions of the law of nations, 
especially in the context of fishing, had been up until the time of Grotius for the most part a 
localised activity.  
However by the Middle Ages fishermen had gradually begun to venture gradually farther from 
their ports. By the sixteenth century (the the Time of Grotius and the Dutch East India 
Company)  Dutch fishermen were swarming off the coast of the British Isles as commercial 
herring fishing activity increasingly spread to larger areas of the North Sea and to the northeast 
Atlantic off the coasts of Iceland, Norway, and Greenland.66 Soroos points out that with the 
discovery of the New World the productive Grand Banks cod fisheries off the coast of 
Newfoundland began to be exploited.67 The notion of freedom of the high seas and common 
title to its fishes no longer sat well with everyone during Enlightenment Europe, especially in 
England. Heidbrink argues that the combination of the lack of control of foreign vessels in the 
‗local‘ waters of other coastal states coupled with an ever increasing fishing capacity, illustrated 
for the first time the susceptibility of fish stocks to overfishing.68 All of a sudden Grotius‘s 
concept of unfettered freedom of the seas no longer rang so true because all of a sudden people 
began to realise that the bounty of the sea was not endless. Scottish Lawyer William Welwood in 
Sealaws of Scotland (1613) accepted Grotius contention that navigation on the High Seas should be 
free, but argued that coastal states had the right to restrict access to off-shore fisheries that were 
becoming exhausted.69As it turned out, despite Mare Liberum and Grotius‘s various other writings 
advocating freedom of the seas – freedom of the seas never did represent the accepted custom, 
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that is, it was not accepted state practice until the early nineteenth century when England 
emerged as the supreme global naval superpower.70 
Furthermore, it is argued by many commentators that the demise of Natural Law as a political 
doctrine in the course of conflicts against royal absolutism, gave way to positivism and ideas of 
nationalism, and of consensual government that were in keeping with Rousseau‘s ‗Social 
Contract‘.71 This idea of formalised consent, and nationhood arguably paved the way for 
appropriation of the global commons in favour of the national commons. 
 
(ii)  Seldon 
 
In his 1635 book Mare Clausum,72 British lawyer and diplomat John Seldon put forward a 
contrasting perspective to that of Grotius. Seldon argued that coastal states had rights to the 
seas, so long as they could exert control over them. It is arguable that Selden‘s proposal is closer 
to modern conceptions of the seas and territorial jurisdiction, and although it is concerned with 
the sea as a whole and not the resources within it, it is consistent with the principles in Baldick.  
Seldon advocated the presence of a ‗maritime belt‘ which should fall under a state‘s territorial 
waters. Italian jurists also aware of increasing Dutch incursions argued for a 100 mile zone or the 
‗two days sailing rule‘.73 Numerous other treaties began to emerge that where the methods of 
maritime delimitation were as varied as they were uncertain; the line of sight rule (which varied 
between 3 and 50 miles depending on where one was looking and whether one used a telescope), 
or set distance in leagues as was the method of the Scandinavians.74 In the end the ‗canon-shot 
rule‘ posited by Van Bynkershoek won out, where it was accepted that seas that were within the 
distance of a canon shot were deemed to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of sovereign states, 
and therefore not part of the ‗International‘ Commons.75 But even this rule had its 
inconsistencies, as it depended entirely on canon technology. However by the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars in 1815 it was accepted that three miles became the international standard of 
marine delimitation.76This canon-shot rule became the basis of ocean governance until World 
War II.77 Crucially, apart from waters that were deemed to be an extension of states territory 
pursuant to the canon-shot rule, no state held any jurisdiction over the rest of the ocean which 
still remained common and free for all to use. 
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This doctrine of ‗freedom of use‘ was a central maxim within the law of nations that went back 
millennia to when trading vessels searched the globe for trading ports. The doctrine was 
recognised and practiced within many civilisations, including the diplomatic and treaty 
relationship among the Chinese kingdoms during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States, the 
arbitration system of the ancient Greeks, and of course the concept of  jus gentium which was a 
feature of ancient Roman legal system.78 Even Japanese Lords in the 16th Century (whose main 
interest in relation to fisheries was to collect taxes and secure labour for the coastguard) – 
divided up their coastal waters and allocated them to fiefs.79 However it is Roman law that I wish 
to shed light on further due to its relevance to Early-Modern European jurisprudence and 
international relations, and especially the two jus gentium principles that applied to the Commons; 
res nullius and res communis.80  
(iii)  Res nullius 
Res nullius – (literally nobody‘s thing or nobody's property) is Roman law doctrine that concerned 
the acquisition of property.81 Simply put something that belongs to nobody can be appropriated, 
so long as that appropriation is consistent with the law. 
The doctrine of res nullius is a well used doctrine in western jurisprudence, and was for the most 
part the primary ‗legal‘ basis by which Western Europe asserted sovereignty over large tracts of 
uninhabited or ‗under-inhabited‘ territory. This doctrine was termed terra nullius which literally 
translates as nobody‘s land. In order for a state to appropriate and colonize this land, they had to 
do so consistently with the Law of [Civilized] Nations. The first step in Colonial appropriation 
was an act of discovery coupled with a Crown Grant or Charter by a ‗Christian‘ Sovereign which 
on an international level would serve to justify one colonising power‘s superior claim vis-à-vis 
the claim of another ‗would be‘ colonising power.82 However to legitimise the claim the 
Colonising State had to exercise uninterrupted control over the possession.83 This second step 
acknowledged the centrality of the principles of settlement, defence, contiguity and long usage in 
the Law of Nations as the ―oldest and most recognised principles of legal title in the world‖.84 
Another dimension of the doctrine of terra nullius was promulgated by John Locke in his Two 
Treatises of Government (1728), where terra nullius was a wasteland and inconsistent with not only 
the Law of Nations but also Natural Law.85  
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Locke believed that; 86 
―… [T]he law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for 
other men‘s actions must, as well as their own and other men‘s actions, be conformable to the law of nature.‖ 
With respect to property, Locke sees the difference between mere property and real property. 
Locke applies the doctrine of res nullius to land; 87  
 ―But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth 
itself, as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest, I think it is plain that property in that too is acquired as the 
former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. 
He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common […] God and his reason commanded him to subdue the 
earth - i.e., improve it for the benefit of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, 
in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was 
his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.‖  
Locke further asserts; 88 
―God gave the world to men in common, but since He gave it them for their benefit and the greatest conveniences 
of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain common and 
uncultivated.‖ 
Thus according to Locke, subduing the common and enclosing is was a command of God, and 
therefore consistent with Natural Law. It follows that given the idea that Law of Nations 
conforms to the law of nature, to appropriate the common is consistent with International 
Law.89 However, the question remains as to whether terra nullius in its general conception - res 
nullius - is applicable to the ocean? That is, can the ocean be appropriated given that the Romans 
had designated it res communis.90 
The amenability of something to be property according to Locke is in ‗legally‘ removing it from the 
commons and adding ones labour to it in order to transform it into personal property.  Locke 
writes;91 
―God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his property, which could not be taken from him 
wherever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth and having dominion, we see, are joined together. 
The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate. And the 
condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduce private possessions.‖ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Contexts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993); Jianming Shen ―The Relativity and Historical Perspective 
of the Golden Age of International Law‖(2000) International Legal Theory 6(1): 15-34 
86
 John Locke, Two Treatise of Government: A Critical Edition With an Introduction and Aparatus Criticus by Peter Laslett  
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960) § 135. 
87
 Ibid., § 32. 
88
 Ibid., § 34. 
89 Jianming Shen ―The Relativity and Historical Perspective of the Golden Age of International Law‖ (2000) 
International Legal Theory 6(1): 15-34: 19. 
90
 Marie Alice Chardeaux, Les Choses Communes: Thèse Droit Privé (La Librairie Jurdique de Référence [LGDJ], Paris, 
2006). 
91
 John Locke, Two Treatise of Government: A Critical Edition With an Introduction and Aparatus Criticus by Peter Laslett  
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960) § 35. 
19 
 
As Locke expressly mentions cultivation and earth, and where by implication with the nature of 
the labour added to the earth in order to transform it to private property, it would appear that 
taking possession of the Marine Common is not what Locke had in mind. Nonetheless I suggest 
that his criteria are applicable to the oceans. The oceans can be subdued, managed and excluded. 
Locke‘s references to enclosure although in the context of land, are nonetheless applicable to the 
ocean as well. Technology and political maritime delimitation have an enclosing function. So it 
follows then that those Coastal States with the resources to appropriate the ocean and remove it 
from the commons are according to Locke justified in claiming sovereignty or jurisdiction over 
it. 
 
So just as the doctrine of terra nullius benefits the nations with the technology and means to 
colonise either uninhabited or ‗under-inhabited‘ lands, the doctrine of res nullius benefits those 
Coastal States that have the means to assert jurisdiction over adjacent waters, and control them. 
The commonly accepted tools with which States could directly apply the doctrine of res nullius 
over the Marine Common, were articulated by the Dutch jurist Cornelius Van Bynkershoek in 
De Domino Maris (1702) where he wrote the famous phrase terrae dominum finitur, ubi finitur 
armorium vis (the dominion of the land ends where the range of weapons ends), which came to be 
known in his day as the canon-shot rule.92 Today it could be the ‗Coastguard‘ or ‗Missile‘ rule. 
This Van Bynkershoekean idea of ‗the territorial aspect of the state extending to as far as the 
state can control‘ is consistent with Lockean ideology, and is especially significant today. Just like 
during the Colonial period when technologically superior states could impose their will against 
inferior ‗uncivilised‘ states and subjugate and appropriate vast tracts of territory, today some 
states have the ability to subjugate and control wide tracts of ocean and continental shelf, to the 
exclusion of others who lack the ability. It is therefore no surprise that western coastal states that 
have been quick to apply the doctrine of res nullius and have been apt to do so. Kahn argues that 
in the context of claiming the continental shelf which is limited at 200nm, western coastal states 
[including New Zealand and Australia] pushed for jurisdiction far beyond the accepted 200nm 
isobaths provided that the shelf was adjacent and exploitable. 93 To buttress their claim they cited 
the North Sea Continental Shelf case in which the International Court of Justice held that a claim to 
the Continental Shelf required more than mere adjacency, distance and configuration also had to 
be taken into account.94 The ICJ held that the ―most fundamental‖ principle of the continental 
shelf doctrine is that the rights of the coastal states ―in respect of the area of continental shelf that 
constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio.‖95  
However the application of res nullius to the World‘s maritime commons and its amenability to 
appropriation does have with it conditions. These conditions although articulated by Locke, are 
just as applicable today. They are a general consent and appropriation without prejudice.  
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Hugo Grotius argued in Mare Liberum (1609) private property arose ―not by a deliberate act of 
will but by a kind of agreement.‖96   Locke also recognised that appropriation of the commons 
required consent but for Locke the consent did not need to be express. Instead for Locke the 
consent was tacit; it was accepted as general principle that application of one‘s labour to 
property, had the effect of removing it from the commons;97 
―By making an explicit consent of every commoner necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is 
given in common […] His labour hath taken it out of the hands of Nature where it was common, and belonged equally 
to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.‖  
As to appropriation without prejudice Locke writes on a number of occasions that the 
amenability of appropriation of the commons is conditional on there being sufficient commons 
left for other commoners. Locke writes;98 
―The measure of property Nature well set, by the extent of men's labour and the conveniency of life. No man's labour 
could subdue or appropriate all, nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for 
any man, this way, to entrench upon the right of another or acquire to himself a property to the prejudice of his neighbour, 
who would still have room for as good and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was 
appropriated.‖ 
To this day ‗appropriation without prejudice‘ remains a significant issue, especially when 
marine resources are unevenly distributed. Soroos points out that states with the resources 
to do so, have even unilaterally (often inconsistently with international law) claimed 
jurisdiction over parts of the oceans in the interests of security, conservation and in recent 
times to exercise exclusive rights to offshore oil and gas reserves.99 On the 28th September 
1945 US President Harry Truman proclaimed;100 
―Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its natural resources, the Government of 
the US regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but 
contiguous to the coasts of the US as appertaining to the US, subject to its jurisdiction and control.‖ 
Two years later, Iceland used the Truman Proclamation as a buttress for their own proclamation, 
where they proclaimed a comparable law that saw fish stocks on the whole shelf of the island 
come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Island.101  
Res nullius is the prevailing doctrine, along with the associated principles of contiguity, effective 
occupation and Lockean exclusive possession behind the establishment of the exclusive 
economic rights of coastal states over the resources of the water column for a distance of 200 nm 
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- the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – that was adopted by the General Assembly in 1982.102 It 
is arguable that at the point of being designated res nullius and therefore the property of no-one, it 
was possible for someone to take exclusive possession of it, by exercising control. One noticeable 
feature of contemporary sovereignty and jurisdiction over adjacent bodies of water and sea bed 
by coastal states is that for the moment at least the Lockean ‗appropriation without prejudice 
limitation‘ has resulted in the High Seas still remaining common. That is they are still res nullius, 
and therefore the property of no one. However traditionally, perhaps the High Seas had a 
different designation. 
(iv)  Res communis 
Res communis – (literally everybody‘s thing or everybody's property) is Roman property law 
doctrine that contrasts with the other Roman doctrine of res nullius.  Simply put property that is 
res communis is the property of everyone and no one in particular. Traditionally property that is res 
communis by its nature may not be appropriated. The sea, the ocean, the atmosphere, sanctuaries 
or public baths were cited by the Romans as examples of res communis. 103 According to the 
Romans water or air, capable of being separated from the sea, ocean, or the atmosphere, and 
which can be appropriated for purposes of private use or consumption, are res nullius, because 
they are capable of possession and ownership individually or even collectively. 
To some commentators the traditional Roman law conception of res communis is similar, to the 
notion of inheritance or the ‗common heritage of man‘. However other commentators assert that 
res universitatis is more in keeping with the ‗common heritage of man‘. They argue that res communis 
invokes notions of citizenship, whereas res universitatis invokes notions of humanity.104 This 
distinction is significant when it comes to ascertaining the status of the world‘s oceans as 
common or property. The benefit of the doctrine res communis is vested in citizens and not in 
humanity. This presupposes that citizens are to have the benefit of res communis at the expense of 
the rest of humanity. It must follow then that the benefit of res communis is owned by the citizens 
as joint tenants, and so res communis falls within the imperium of a state, and is a designation 
where no one has dominium, primarily due to its nature. This makes res communis an intermediate 
doctrine between res nullius and res universitatis; because if that which is truly owned beneficially by 
all of humanity and no one in particular and is therefore incapable of falling within the imperium 
of any state is res universitatis, then what is left must be capable of being appropriated according to 
the doctrine of res nullius. So res communis in its Roman conception could be described as a 
national common, as a reserve, or a lake is today. However what is clear is that the sea whether 
deemed res universitatis or res nullius is by its nature unable to be appropriated as a land can be or 
as a fish that is plucked out of the ocean can be because by its nature is as able to be reduced to 
exclusive possession. This however leaves another question – if the benefit sea is res communis 
how can someone have title to the fishes in the sea? 
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In modern usage the concept of res communis is distinguished by two characteristics: first things 
that are res communis may not be appropriated; and second use of things that are res communis 
belong equally to the people.105 Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas which was 
adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea outlined the modern 
conception of res communis in international law:106 
The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. 
Freedom of the seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international 
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states: 
1) Freedom of navigation; 
2) Freedom of fishing; 
3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
4) Freedom to fly over the high seas 
These freedoms, and others which are recognised by the general principles of international law, shall be exercise by all 
States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in the exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 
 
This principle of Freedom of the High Seas was re-iterated, as was the inalienable nature of 
the high seas and the fishes within it by Justice de Castro in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 
which was heard by the ICJ 16 years after the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. He 
held;107 
―The high seas, ‗res communis omnium‘, is not something that lends itself to ownership; its use is common to 
everybody, and this applies also to fishing. The sea ‗unquam fuit a communion hominum seperatum‘, and 
unlike lands and rivers, there is no reason to divide it up; fish stocks in the sea are inexhaustible and it would 
be iniquitous to divide up ownership in them of the right to fish for them.‖ 
 
Here the international legal community is unequivocal about the status of the high seas as res 
communis, as being outside the imperium of any State, contrasting it from the Roman conception 
of the doctrine. Also what is clear is that the right to fish is also free. But what of the fishes 
themselves – are they res communis?  
 
According to Locke, res communis applies to the resources in their natural state, but once fished, 
and reduced to ones possessions then they become the property of the fisherman.108 This makes 
the fishes themselves, res nullius. Locke wrote;109 
―Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person." 
This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say, are 
properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed 
from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common 
right of other men. For this "labour" being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right 
to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.‖ 
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To Locke it is the labour that someone adds to a thing like a fish, in the fishing of it that 
converts something from common property to private property. Furthermore, Locke 
acknowledges that things can be alienated from the commons, and are capable of use and 
possession; 110 
―Children or servants could not cut the meat which their father or master had provided for them in common without 
assigning to everyone his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt but 
that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out?‖ 
Grotius illustrates the distinction further;111 
―[W]hen a slave says: ―the sea is certainly common to all persons,‖ the fisherman agrees; but when the slave adds:‖Then 
what is found in the common sea is common property,‖ he rightly objects, saying:‖But what my net and hooks have 
taken is absolutely my own.‖ 
For me the judgment by Justice de Castro in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case where he held fish 
stocks to be inexhaustible coupled with the two doctrines of res nullius and res communis in a 
modern setting has profound consequences. 
 
First of all the doctrine of res nullius where the waters fall under the jurisdiction of the coastal 
state as being both a continuation of the Coastal State‘s territory and being controllable by that 
same coastal state, thereby making the fishes in those waters fall within the jurisdiction of that 
state, has effect of removing resources from the commons. This is arguably sellable to other 
third states because the high seas have been deemed res communis, and therefore unable to 
appropriated. This coupled with the blind assertion of the ICJ the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case that 
deemed fish stocks inexhaustible, when since the time of Selden States have known that fish 
stocks are susceptible to exhaustion has lead to a global grab. In recent years pursuant to the 
doctrine of res nullius coastal states have claimed coastal state jurisdiction over adjacent waters to 
the incredible distance of 200nm from their shoreline in order to protect their local fish stocks. 
And pursuant to the doctrine of res communis States are fishing the high seas common at 
unprecedented levels in order to secure access to its resources, at the expense of other states; this 
situation is what Hardin termed ‗Tragedy of the Commons‘.112  
 
In sum, both res nullius and res communis result in unequal distribution – where the rich and 
technologically advanced States will benefit most.113 With the ‗first come first served‘ rule 
prevailing on the high seas especially in the context of fishing, poorer less technologically states 
who lack fast super-trawlers, spotting equipment and military hardware end up suffering unequal 
access. Furthermore and most importantly it is the rich states that make the rules because they 
have the economic leverage to do so. This mal-distribution is one of the drivers behind IUU 
fishing. 
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F TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS  
In the time of Grotius, not only were the World‘s fisheries perceived as limitless, the very notion 
of having property in the fishes in the sea was absurd. 114 But as we have since seen, both notions 
have been turned on their head. UNCLOS has included both Coastal state sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the sea and its resources and has unequivocally declared the high seas res 
communis. Furthermore, UNCLOS has bestowed on all states an obligation of sustainable use of 
the ocean and its resources – two of the driving forces behind these provisions was the 
susceptibility of fish stocks to exhaustion, and equality of access to marine resources – including 
fisheries. However the apportioning of the world‘s most productive seas by coastal states into 
Territorial Seas and EEZ‘s, may have had a beneficial effect on some of the fisheries within 
those maritime zones, but outside those zones on the high seas, where there are now fewer fish 
for more fishing boats – the ‗free for all‘ mass exploitation can only be described as a tragedy – 
not just for the fishes in those waters, but for humankind as well who are fishing certain species 
of fish to extinction. 
It is the highly migrating and straddling fish stocks – the large predatory fish that sit at the top of 
the food chain, breed slowly, and have few natural predators – that are being systematically 
caught and consumed. According to Paul Greenberg; ―with wild fish we have chosen, time after time, to 
ignore the fundamental limits the law of nature places on ecosystems and have consistently removed more fish than 
can be replaced by natural process.‖115 According to Myers ―[it] is estimated that the global ocean has 
lost more than 90% of large predatory fishes with an 80% decline typically occurring ―within 15 
years of industrialized exploitation.‖116 Thomas Dietz argues that the chaotic interplay among 
ocean ecologies, fishing technologies, and inadequate governance is threatening massive marine 
ecosystem degradation.117 
In a recent National Geographic Magazine article Greenberg exposes the tragedy of overfishing 
the high seas.118 In the article Greenberg discusses the ‗Seafood Print‘ study that Dr. Pauly and 
Enric Sala have been conducting, that shows that the capture of ‗lesser‘ species such as 
anchovies, krill and plankton also have a deterious effect on top order predatory fish species like 
Tuna and Toothfish. Pauly and Sala have isolated the ‗Seafood Print‘ showing that one 250kg 
Blue Fin Tuna is the equivalent to 2500kg of intermediate predatory fish. That is the equivalent 
of 10 Pacific Herring. The capturing of 10 Pacific Herring has the effect of 1 Blue Fin Tuna but 
also 25,000kg of first order predatory fish like Peruvian Anchovies. It follows then that the 
capture and consumption of 25,000kg of Anchovies also removes from the ocean 1 Blue Fin 
Tuna, and 10 Pacific Herrings. But also it represents the harvesting of 250,000kgs of primary 
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producers like planktons which are harvested for life-stock feed.119 I must point out that this 
explanation of the ‗Seafood Print‘ model is a very simplistic linear explanation, it is much more 
complicated and interdependent than this, involving seabirds, marine mammals and sea plants 
and corals.120 The upshot is that human plunder of the high seas commons has an ecological 
impact.  
Yet the ‗Tragedy of the Commons‘ put forward by Hardin in 1968 is more than merely 
ecological. Hardin‘s model has been postulated in by many to characterise overcrowding in many 
sectors, including pollution, intellectual property and radio spectrums. However according to 
Hsu, Hardin‘s Tragedy of the Commons was centred around ―exorcising the spirit of Adam Smith‖ 
by attacking the ―perils of unconstrained freedom.‖121 The crux of Hardin‘s model is the 
isolation of key elements such as resource scarcity, free rider problems, the lack of property 
rights,122 and I would also add to this list human population pressures, improved resource 
appropriation technology, unequal resource distribution and increased commodity prices; all of 
which serve as drivers behind IUU fishing.123  
Hardin argued that the laissez faire approach where the market will eventually ―promote public 
interest‘ that is attributed to Adam Smith, in some situations may not be the most beneficial 
outcome for society in general;124 
―In economic affairs, The Wealth of Nations (1776) popularized the "invisible hand," the idea that an individual who 
"intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promote…the public interest." Adam Smith did 
not assert that this was invariably true and perhaps neither did any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant 
tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to 
assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society. If this assumption is 
correct it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez faire in reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that 
men will control their individual fecundity so as to produce the optimum population. If the assumption is not correct, we 
need to re-examine our individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible.‖ 
According to Dietz, Hardin drew attention to two human factors that drive environmental 
change; (i) the increasing demand for natural resources and environmental services, stemming 
from growth in human population and per capita resource consumption and (ii) institutional 
arrangements – that is, the way ‗in which humans organize themselves to extract resources from 
the environment (and eject effluents into it).‘125 Hardin analogises that the way in which the 
tragedy of the commons develops is akin to a common pasture and some herdsmen;126 
―… It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an 
arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the 
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numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of 
reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic 
of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. 
Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my 
herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component: (1) The positive component is a function of the 
increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive 
utility is nearly + 1; (2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. 
Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision 
making herdsman is only a fraction of - 1.  
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to 
pursue is to add another animal to his herd… and another... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every 
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit -- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings 
ruin to all.‖  
Fisheries are similar to Hardin‘s pasture analogy except instead of using up grazing, one is using 
up the fishes, to the point were increased fishing pressure has caused certain stocks of fish to 
become overfished and threatening the total collapse of the fishery. A fishery collapses when the 
―level of fish caught jeopardises the capacity of the fishery to produce a maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY).‖127 In 1966 Economist Frederick Bell empirically verified the overexploitation of a 
commons New England's northern lobster fishery. He found that an ―efficient output of lobster 
would have occurred at 17.2 million pounds. To attain this output, the efficient number of 
lobster traps would have been 433,000. However, during 1966 Bell found that fishers employed 
too much capital – 891,000 traps – to harvest too many lobsters – 25 million pounds.‖128 
Many fisheries economists have indicated that many commercial fisheries are already closed or 
producing lower harvests, with serious economic repercussions for the fishermen and for the 
communities in which they live. Thompson points out that in 1992, Canada was forced to close 
its commercial ground fishery off Newfoundland which lead to the ―loss of some 40,000 jobs, 
the withering of local communities, and a social welfare bill exceeding $1 billion.‖129 A fishing 
moratorium exists over the Grand Banks and Georges Bank, once among the greatest cod 
fishing grounds in the world.130  
 
According to Nickler an open access commons system usually follows a ―four step pattern of 
development: (1) discovery; (2) expansion; (3) overexploitation; and (4) collapse.‖131  A species 
that clearly illustrates Nickler‘s four step pattern the tragedy of the commons is the Atlantic Blue 
Fin Tuna. These fish are one of the worlds most sought after eating fish. A fully grown Blue Fin 
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can usually bring in as much as $50,000 US for the fisherman.132 Recently a single 250kg fish sold 
in Japan for $175,000.133 Blue Fin Tuna are a valuable commercial enterprise that brings in a 
substantial export income for states. It is no surprise that fishing states are engaging in what 
Nickler terms a ―race to the resource.‖134 The drive to supply the Japanese sashimi, sushi and 
otoro market has lead tuna fishing boats to ―drop more hooks and nets than any other form of 
fishing.‖135 McIntyre sombrely writes that ―since the dawn of industrialised fishing, bluefin tuna 
stocks have plummeted by over 85%‖ – for they are the ―most comprehensively over-hunted, 
over-eaten and over-traded beast on the planet‖ – It is said that fewer than 900 may remain in 
the North American stock.136 Furthermore the Blue Fin‘s highly migratory nature makes them all 
the more vulnerable – they swim in and out of managed territorial seas and EEZ‘s and into the 
nets that wait for them in the High Seas Commons.  
 
So this leaves the question? How do we overcome the Tragedy of the Commons and ensure the 
sustainable management of highly migratory species like the Bluefin Tuna and the Patagonian 
Toothfish, given that EEZ‘s fall under the jurisdiction of the coastal state and given that 
freedom of fishing on the high seas is guaranteed since they are res communis and therefore 
incapable of falling under the jurisdiction of any state? 
(i) Overcoming the Tragedy of the Commons 
As we established above Hardin‘s story of overexploitation of the open access commons 
contrasts with Smith‘s narrative illustrating ―the coincidence of self-interest and collective 
interest‖ – Adam Smith‘s story describes self-interest increasing collective wealth.137 Hsu points 
out that by implication Smith‘s narrative does not require government intervention, and so since 
Hardin‘s story is ‗antithetical‘, it follows then that according to Hardin, overcoming the tragedy 
requires governmental intervention.138 More specifically Hardin advocates ―social arrangements 
that produce responsibility‖ which he terms ―mutual coercion mutually agreed upon.‖139 Simply 
put Hardin is saying that a variety of generally accepted interventions may be required, including 
governmental regulation, governmental imposed limitations, and even privatisation.140  Hardin‘s 
thesis is that mutual coercion or governance is essential to mitigate against the tragedy, because 
left unchecked fishermen will fish out the Commons.  
Some commentators including Sugden argue that Hardin‘s tragedy of the commons ―belongs to 
a class of problems that have no technical solution, effectively denying a role for science.‖141 And 
although initially this may have appeared to be the case, today the one of the reasons why earlier 
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regulation of the commons has been seen to be such a failure is the exclusion of fisheries 
scientists and the application of an ecological approach to the regulatory process. This approach 
was subsequently seen to be problematic. According to Dietz;142 
―Devising effective governance systems [that support diverse life, including conflicting human values and interests and a 
reasonable quality of life for humans] is akin to a co-evolutionary race. A set of rules crafted to fit one set of socio-
ecological conditions can erode as social, economic, and technological developments increase the potential for human 
damage to ecosystems and even to the biosphere itself. Furthermore, humans devise ways of evading governance rules. 
Thus, successful commons governance requires that rules evolve.‖  
It is clear that the governance model required to mitigate against Hardin‘s tragedy needs a 
multipronged approach, that takes into account ecological factors as well as socio-economic 
ones. Although Hardin‘s tragedy has activated regulation that minimise individual action in 
favour of effective governance and regulatory (and more recently market) solutions, it is arguable 
that it did so by vilifying fishermen and the excluding them from the high seas decision making 
process. Haward and Vince argue that ―regulatory and government control‖ became the only 
means of protecting fishstocks and controlling fishermen.143 Haward and Vince further assert 
that as fishermen became increasingly seen as ―selfish profit maximisers‖ and regulators 
increasingly became the ‗high seas protectors‘ – the more this perspective became self 
fulfilling.144 So as the perception that government regulation was required increased the more 
removed the fishermen came from the regulatory process, and the more tragic the solution 
became. According to Donald Leal, ―for decades, governments have tried to avoid the tragedy of the 
commons through regulations. They have limited season length, constricted the areas open to fishing, dictated types 
of gear and the size and power of vessels, and set a minimum size for landed fish.‖ However these 
prescriptions calling for central governments and other institutions to impose uniform 
regulations over fish-stocks and fishing practice have not eliminated overfishing, nor have they 
prevented wasteful fishing practices and damage to marine ecosystems.145 Leal argues that these 
regulations don‘t often work because fishermen react in very human ways.146 He argues that 
when the season is shortened, fishermen with accompanying subsidies purchase bigger, faster 
boats to catch the same amount of fish or more in a shorter time.147 Furthermore the limitation 
of catch sizes per fishing trip invariably leads to the discard of lower quality fish over the side of 
the trawler.148 
Furthermore many of these prescriptions and regulations are predicated on the premise that 
fishermen are predisposed to fish the commons to collapse. Ostrom asserts that these 
prescriptions are not supported by empirical research. On the contrary ―[f]ield studies in all parts of 
the world have found that local groups of resource users, sometimes by themselves and sometimes with the assistance 
of external authorities, have created a wide diversity of institutional arrangements for coping with common-pool 
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resources.‖149 Indeed according to Thomson; ―most of the recent academic literature on the 
tragedy of the commons has examined why some commons do not lead to tragic 
consequences.‖150 Many commentators have shown that local communities throughout the world 
sometimes have been able to avoid the tragedy through the development of local management 
institutions. Economists have long argued that the tragedy could be better mitigated if we 
"privatized the commons," that is, created ―individual private property rights for common-pool 
resources.‖ 151 That process is beginning to happen.152 
Leal points out that individual fishing quotas, called IFQs or ITQs (for individual transferable 
quotas), are a locally managed institution that has drastically turned the table on the tragedy.153 
Leal explains;154 
―With IFQs, however, each fisherman is entitled to catch a specified portion of the total allowable catch that is set each 
season by fishery managers. The fisherman can take the quota when he wants to, and the race to fish disappears. Because 
the quota shares are transferable, current holders can adjust the size of their fishing operations by buying and selling 
quota shares, or even retire from the business. New Zealand and Iceland use individual quota programs to manage 
nearly all their commercial fisheries.‖ 
The institution of IFQs involves and empowers the fisherman but at the same time relies on 
Hardian mutual coercion where governmental regulatory bodies monitor and set catches.155 
Some commentators fear that IFQs may lead to privatization of fisheries, however 
commentators must bear in mind that the waters fall within the enforcement jurisdiction of the 
Coastal state and it is the coastal state that not only allocates the IFQs, but also enforces them, 
revokes them and assesses the health of fish stocks. 
Yet the question remains – Seldenian mare clausum management strategies like IFQs may be 
successful in the context of local waters, territorial seas and the EEZs that fall within the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state. But what of the High Seas that are by their nature are mare liberum 
and res communis and therefore rests beyond the jurisdiction of any Coastal state?  
On the High Seas Hardin‘s tragedy remains a sobering notion. To halt this slide toward a ‗marine 
dystopia‘ a system of high seas governance with teeth is required. Daniel Pauly asserts that 
regulatory agencies must impose well structured quotas on the amount of fish caught in any 
given year. 156 Pauly argues that ―simply permitting all fisheries to catch a given aggregate number 
of fish annually results in a wasteful build-up of fleets and vessels as fisheries race to grab as large 
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a share of the quota as possible before their competitors do. Such a system may protect the fish, 
but it is economically disastrous.‖157 
The present international regime centred around the fisheries of the High Seas is complicated, 
inefficient, uncertain and problematic – and plagued by a problem that comes right out of 
Hardin‘s book – IUU Fishing or Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing. Instituting 
regional, supra-national and international solutions to IUU fishing on the High Seas has in the 
last decade been a cause célèbre since the collapse of various fisheries in the 1990s. Furthermore as 
Pauly argues;158 
―[I]t is not just the future of the fishing industry that is at stake, but also the continued health of the world‘s largest 
ecosystem. While the climate crisis gathers front-page attention on a regular basis, people--even those who profess great 
environmental consciousness--continue to eat fish as if it were a sustainable practice.‖ 
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III CONTEMPORARY HIGH SEAS GOVERNANCE 
Throughout history governance over the Sea and its resources has been dominated by two 
doctrines; that of res nullius which predisposes the Sea to appropriation and control; and that of 
res communis which states that by its nature the Sea in incapable to appropriation, and in keeping 
with natural law is the property off all, and no-one. These ancient doctrines have been applied in 
various conceptions throughout history, by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Greeks and even the 
Polynesians a culture of Seafarers that believed no-one could own the sea.  
 
To the states of Early Modern Europe who came to dominate the World‘s oceans, the very same 
doctrines were used to justify the positions of a state, claiming maritime rights. The Dutch, an 
emerging naval power in the seventeenth century, championed by Grotius, advocated a mare 
liberum claiming that the sea was a res communis or a commons and so belonging to all, and no-one 
in particular. Whereas the British who had recently established themselves as the premier global 
naval power at the expense of the Spanish, and in particular Selden, advocated for a mare clausum 
where the Sea by virtue of being res nullius was capable of being appropriated and excluded from 
the commons. 
 
This chapter will show that the customary normative course that has been chartered historically 
continues to loom large in UNCLOS today – especially in the context of the global fisheries. 
According to Gavouneli, UNCLOS represents;159 
 ―The culmination of the tug-of-war between sovereignty of the Coastal Sate, which atavistically purports to expand its 
power further and further away from land; and the freedom of the high Seas, a principle partly created as a reflexion of 
the impossibility to subdue the vast expanse of water for long centuries in human history.‖ 
However as we have already ascertained in the previous chapter this Grotian v Seldenian tug-of-
war was overcome with the formalising of both contradictory doctrines of mare clausum and mare 
liberum into the ink of the Convention. Yet in the context of fisheries the tug-of-war is very much 
alive. Where the former which applies to the EEZ has certainly facilitated better fisheries 
management where fishes fall under both the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of the 
Coastal State.160 But what of the High Seas, which UNCLOS designates a global commons or 
mare liberum? We established in the previous chapter with Hardin‘s Tragedy of the Commons that not 
only are people predisposed to fish out those commons; ―common property in fish leads to 
economic inefficiency.‖161  
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Yet in spite of the long held awareness of the need for the high seas and its fishstocks to be 
sustainably managed, the codified normative framework established in UNCLOS – is centred on 
jurisdiction and the lack thereof – any provision that deals with actual management lacks teeth 
and clarity.  
 
Where there was an opportunity during the UNCLOS III conferences to set up a framework 
that would mitigate the tragedy of the commons, that opportunity was squandered. Now the 
high Seas fisheries regime is dominated by historic norms that guarantee the freedom of fishing, 
and exclusive flag state jurisdiction over fishing boats. The central premise of this essay is that 
these two norms have proven to be monumental obstacles in the management of the high seas 
fisheries. And even in the face of subsequent international co-operation and the establishment of 
new conventions that address the lacunae left by UNCLOS in the context of fishing on the high 
seas, these two principles serve as justification for IUU fishing, which not only undermines these 
measures, but furthers Hardin‘s tragedy of the commons doctrine, by continuing to fish at a rate 
that is unsustainable and recklessly doing so in the face of imminent collapse of high seas 
migratory and straddling fish stocks.  
 
This chapter will look at UNCLOS in the context of High Seas Fisheries – and will show that the 
contemporary regime is shaped by the very same historical principles and pre-existing normative 
arguments that are discussed above, applied today through a constructivist process; that is path 
dependent, hindered by the limited positivist toolkit with which international rule makers make 
rules and dominated by short term political agenda where often domestic political ends trump 
International relations.  
 
A FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE CONTEMPORARY FRAMEWORK 
 
(i) Constructivism 
The high seas fishing regime is constructed from historic norms that arguably further short term 
agenda without reference to power relationships among the parties, unequal distributive 
relationships and furthermore it seems that the states parties in the construction of the present 
UNCLOS high seas fisheries regime failed to acknowledge the elephant in the room; fishstocks. 
The present regime guarantees the freedom to fish in the absence of any Coastal State 
jurisdiction, but fails to put in place any mechanisms by which high seas fishstocks that are free 
to fish can be managed, and thereby ensure the free fishing it promises.  
Commentators label this approach to institution building as constructivism. Broadly, 
constructivism refers to the idea that human interests and power structures are not natural and 
given in a pre-existing order but rather are effected through ideas and norms. Finnemore writes 
―interests are not just ‗out there‘ waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social 
interaction.‖162 According to Wendt constructivist decision making wants ‗the structures of 
human association to be determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and it 
wants identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather 
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than given by nature.‘163 These ‗shared ideas‘ that Wendt refers to, or ‗norms‘ are structured and 
channelled in order to shape organisational behaviour.164  
The trouble with a constructivist approach to the institution of a governance framework for the 
fisheries of the high seas is that there are questions for which at present there are no normative 
answers. What about the impact of free fishing on high Seas fishes? According to Zannakis 
constructivism ―fails to identify power asymmetries, it ‗censors‘ material factors‖, it 
overemphasises structure, underemphasises material variables and avoids questions of power and 
inequality.165 Zannakis further argues that constructivists fail to ask the crucial question in order 
to understand why social or natural phenomena are perceived as problems, what the problems 
are about, and in what way they are political?166 In the context of the law of the Sea and fish 
stocks the questions as to the effect of application of the normative law of the sea regime was 
not asked? The questions asked and answered were instead the long asked and long answered 
questions of absolute freedom to fish in the context of accepted coastal state encroachment on 
that absolute freedom.  
(ii) Path Dependence 
The present Law of the Sea regime with respect to fishing on the high seas is path dependent in 
that policy or regulatory innovations are wholly dependent on the historic normative framework 
and arguably the principles; the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas and the principle 
of exclusive flag state jurisdiction are so entrenched that any proposal that is put forward in 
furtherance of meaning high seas fishstocks management that is inconsistent with those 
principles is unable to be implemented, irrespective of its effectiveness.  
Simply, path dependence means that where we go next depends not only on where we are now, 
but also upon where we have been.167 Path Dependence according to David; 168  
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―…[R]efers to a property of contingent, non-reversible dynamic processes, including a wide array of processes that can 
properly be described as ‗evolutionary‘. The set of ideas associated with path dependence consequently must occupy a 
central place in the future, historical social science that economics should become.‖ 
Liebowitz & S Margolis argue that the phrase path dependence that implies either (a) that 
―history [in its broadest conception] matters;‖ or (b) that predictable amplifications of small 
differences are a disproportionate cause of later circumstances‖ and that if the path dependence 
is ―strong‖ the historical hang-over is ―inefficient.‖ 169 So where path dependence can be strong, 
so too, can it be weak. Weak path dependence is best demonstrated when the ―efficiency of the 
chosen path is tied with some alternatives‖; semi strong path dependence is demonstrated when 
the chosen path is not the best but not worth fixing; and strong path dependence, which is the 
conception employed in the present regime of the Law of the Sea as it pertains to fisheries, 
where the chosen path is highly inefficient, but is unable to be corrected.170 
Path dependence can refer to either outcomes at a single moment in time or to long run 
equilibria of a process.171 The concept of path dependence originated as an idea that a small 
initial advantage or a few minor random shocks along the way could alter the course of history.172 
This is arguably the case for Microsoft, a small initial advantage that has given rise to an arguable 
inefficient computer platform that is so globally entrenched that sticking with the inefficient 
platform makes more economic sense than doing away with it, which would not be cost 
effective.   
 
In the context of the Law of the Sea and fishing on the high seas, path dependence is reflected in 
the consent for appropriation of waters up to 200 nm from the shoreline by Coastal States by 
UNCLOS states parties and as quid pro quo for that consent the guarantee that fishing on the high 
seas will be free of Coastal State jurisdiction and open to all. In my opinion freedom of fishing 
on the high seas and exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the high seas is tantamount to a kind of 
consideration owed by coastal states to other states, for their divestiture of fishing rights over the 
high seas that now make up the EEZs of the coastal states. This has resulted in strong path 
dependence and the creation of an equilibrium that is such where compliance with the UNCLOS 
provisions has proved to be problematic and arguably unachievable. 
(iii) Positivism 
Positivism is not structural, it is more an approach or a conception of what law is – and it is 
arguable that International Law and international ―conventioning‖ is very positivist. According to 
Churchill and Lowe, positivism is a ―matter of a shift in the balance of the range of rhetorical 
tools employed by jurists than it is of the replacement of one intellectual structure by 
another.‖173―The positivist approach‖ writes Churchill and Lowe, ―with its emphasis upon what 
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states actually do rather than upon what Greeks, Romans, Prophets and common reason might 
have thought that States should do‖ 174, can be traced back to seventeenth century England, and 
theorists such as John Austin, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham who were influenced by 
continental theorists and a movement away from Natural Law.175 
International Conventions are undoubtedly positivist. For example the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice for the purpose of establishing the sources of international law, 
listed as law the following; 176 
(a) ―international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations…‖  
This list unequivocally states what international law is. It is also explicit that anything that does 
not feature in that list is not law – and is therefore unenforceable in International Institutions, 
namely the International Court of Justice.  Even on its own Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice establishes a normative precedent that applies to international law in 
every context. So it follows that the very act of codifying normative principles and reducing them 
to the ink of a Convention has the effect of transforming them from something fluid and 
changeable to something granitic and foundational. In this way the International Legal 
Framework of the Law of the Sea is positivist - that is, its normative foundations are 
unequivocally based on customary norms and general principles of law recognised by civilized 
states that have been codified in an international convention and widely ratified.177 Furthermore 
the positivist nature of UNCLOS is illustrated by the way it is applied through institutions that 
are either creatures of UNCLOS, precede UNCLOS and were instrumental in its establishment, 
or are have been created in furtherance of it. These institutions comply with international rules 
created pursuant to international conventions and custom, and enforce them according to their 
enforcement jurisdiction. 
Churchill and Lowe argue that at least in the context of modern Law of the Sea ―there are signs 
that the age of positivism is passing‖ and ―tested putative rules of law‖ are giving way to a ―looser 
approach to the determinations of normativity, positivism remains the official creed of international lawyers, and 
the place from which we must begin.‖178 
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(iv) Politics 
Fishing on the High Seas is highly susceptible to what Putman sees as linkage politics where 
domestic politics are often inextricably linked with and even played out on the International 
plane. Putnam describes linkage politics as two games;179 
―The Politics of International Negotiations can be usefully conceived as a two level game. At the national level, 
domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians 
seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international Level, National governments 
seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments.‖  
 
Another important factor is a States relative power to another State – that is the inequalities of 
state power.  ―The main purpose of all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies 
compatible with the international political economy.‖180 Yet there are States because of increased clout, 
wealth, and organizational skills are able to invert this premise and make ‗make international 
political economy compatible with the domestic policies of that state.‘ States with the ability to 
do so are able to further political agenda, even at the expense of the expense of the improved 
international relations. It is the opinion of many commentators that short term political agenda 
by some states that undermines the international political process is not always intended. Faeron 
argues that ―it is still true that international political outcomes such as a balance of power are the direct, if 
sometimes unintended, result of individual states‘ foreign policy choices.‖181 
 
Relationships between states are a decisive factor in the way in which high seas policy is 
implemented. States that can politic more readily will arguably have an increased ability to shape 
that policy. Furthermore just as inter-state relationships are central to establishing ‗institutional 
arrangements‘ that address problems and develop ‗plans of action‘,182 they are also responsible 
for the development of some of the problems, including overcapitalisation and subsidies, 
overfishing, excessive by catch, abuse of habitat and inequitable distribution of benefits.183 
 
B THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The Legal Framework of the High Seas Fishery is dominated by UNCLOS – that is, it is at the 
very centre of the contemporary regime that governs all aspect of the world‘s seas and oceans 
and is often described as a ‗comprehensive constitution for the oceans.‘184 UNCLOS was 
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negotiated over a period of eight years (from 1974-1982) and throughout those eight years – the 
issues of deep sea bed mining dominated the agenda.185 Haward argues that UNCLOS is built 
upon the key principle of ―elaborating on the rights of states‖.186 This is certainly the case in the 
context of High Seas Fisheries; where historic principles of Freedom Fishing on the High Seas and 
exclusive Flag State Responsibility are protected, despite the existence of weaker provisions 
affecting actions outside the EEZ – that prompt States to co-operate in furtherance of 
sustainable management of the High Seas Fishery.187 This has been something that it has been 
unsuccessful. Yet in UNCLOS defence, the convention was negotiated in the 70s and early 80s, 
and dominated with 1960‘s and 1970s worldviews which according Haward and Vince, 
emphasized the commercial aspects of the ocean rather than the conservation and sustainable 
aspects.188 UNCLOS certainly predates the Precautionary Principle and for the matter the 
precautionary approach that is advocated by CCAMLR so ardently today.189 
In order to better ascertain the shortcomings of the high seas fisheries regime as provided by 
UNCLOS it is necessary to look at the dominant principles but also the lesser principles that call 
for sustainable high seas fisheries management. 
 
(i) The Principle of Freedom Fishing on the High Seas 
UNCLOS amongst other things including freedom of navigation, guarantees freedom to fish the 
High Seas to all States;190  
―Article 87 - Freedom of the high seas 
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the 
conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal 
and land-locked States: 
[…] 
 (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; […] 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the 
freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the 
Area. 
This provision is unequivocal in it scope – and guarantees freedom to fish to all states ―whether 
coastal or land-locked.‖ Although a states right to fish on the high seas is guaranteed by UNCLOS, 
it must be pointed out that that right is not completely unfettered. Freedom to fish on the high 
seas is conditional on the other provisions laid down in the convention, other rules of 
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international law and with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high 
seas. Furthermore when one reads article 87 with article 116;191 it is clear that a State‘s right to fish 
the high seas is subject to:  
 The State‘s treaty obligations;  
 The rights, duties and interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in article 
63, paragraphs 1 and 2 (for stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones 
of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in 
an area beyond and adjacent to it) and articles 64 to 67 (highly migratory species, 
marine mammals, anadromous stocks, catadromous species); and  
 The provisions of the Convention on the conservation and management of the 
living resources of the high seas (articles 117 to 120). 192  
However, although the above right is not absolute, it is apparent that the principle is clearly 
stated. This contrasts strongly with the conditions placed on the principle which are the subject 
of much uncertainty; where states are required to ‗take or to co-operate with other states in 
taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of 
the living resources of the high seas.‘193 The provisions of the Convention on the conservation 
and management of the living resources of the high seas further require states to ‗protect and 
preserve the marine environment – which also includes rare and fragile ecosystems as well as the 
habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species and other forms of marine life.194 In 
addition to these duties imposed on states while they fish the high seas; are the additional duties 
that pertain to highly migratory species, marine mammals, anadromous stocks, catadromous 
species which are set out in Part V of UNCLOS.195  
Yet it is a widely held view that the duties of the High Seas fishing states are somewhat vaguely 
set out – Article 118 sets out that; ―States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different 
living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the 
conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish sub-regional or 
regional fisheries organizations to this end.‖ However there is no provision on the form of these sub-
regional or regional fisheries organizations. Furthermore practically these sub-regional or regional fisheries 
organizations have their hands tied for they may have the functional jurisdiction to set the Total 
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Allowable Catch (―TAC‖) and establish other conservation measures for the living resources in the high seas196 
the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction precludes these bodies from exercising any enforcement 
jurisdiction that could either ensure compliance with these measures. Ganouveli writes;197 
―The obligation of institutionally concerted action becomes even more crucial in the high seas, where the individuality of each flag 
state reigns supreme and may easily nullify an attempt at conservation or even rational exploitation. Indeed, the exclusivity of 
Coastal State jurisdiction in the EEZ, undoubtedly with its formidable enforcement powers included, has also pushed the world 
fisheries both outwards and deeper: between 1992 and 2002 the global marine fish capture in the high seas rose from 5% to 
11% of the total yield, with more than 30% of it constituting illegal, unreported and unregulated (―IUU‖) fishing.‖ 
When it comes to enforcing sub-regional conservation and TAC measures on the high seas 
pursuant to article 118 of UNCLOS, the convention is silent. In fact the only rule that is express 
about enforcement jurisdiction on the high Seas is article 117 that reiterates the principle of 
exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the high seas –198  
―All States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective 
nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.‖ 
Article 117 clearly leaves the enforcement of such measures to the Flag State, which has the 
effect of rendering the sub-regional or regional fisheries organizations powerless to implement their 
obligations pursuant to the convention. 
(ii) The Principle of Exclusive Flag State Jurisdiction on the High Seas199 
The express duty imposed in article 117 on flag States (to cooperate with other States in order to 
conserve and manage fisheries in areas of the high seas) confirms the law of nationality of ships 
and exclusive flag-State jurisdiction as contained in articles 91 and 94 of UNCLOS – which is 
that compliance and enforcement on the oceans with respect to high seas fisheries is to be 
maintained principally through flag States.200  
Article 94 states unequivocally that ―Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.‖ This exclusive enforcement 
jurisdiction over ships flying the flag of the state is reinforced in the context of a breach where 
even in situations where a coastal state may have prescriptive jurisdiction over that said vessel, 
that ―state which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship have not 
been exercised may report the facts to the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall investigate 
the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the situation.‖201 
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Article 91 states that ‗every state fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of 
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag‘ yet this freedom is conditional on the requirement 
for there to be ―a genuine link between the State and the ship.‖ This requirement of a genuine link as we 
shall see has been problematic – and as yet there is still no solid legal test as to the extent of that 
genuine link.202  
Ganouveli reminds us that the defects of the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction are well 
known.203 She argues and I agree, that the exclusive flag state jurisdiction has been found wanting 
in the context of international shipping – 204 
―The suggestion that lax flag state machinery, unable and unwilling to properly police bulky ocean-going vessels, would 
actually effectively control the actions of a diverse fishing fleet beggars belief.‖ 
Yet the principle becomes more intricate still, when the requirement for a genuine link is required, 
for vessels that are party to effective flag state machinery are free to re-register with other States that 
have ‗open registries‘ and offer ‗flags of convenience‘ fish the high seas with impunity.205 
 
C “RFMOs” - THE „HOBBLED‟ MANAGEMENT MECHANISM? 
 
RFMOs [or as they are described in UNCLOS; sub-regional or regional fisheries organizations] have 
been delegated the critical role of managing the high seas fisheries and ensuring a balance 
between fisheries conservation and fisheries exploitation – a balance they have consistently been 
unable to achieve.206 They are the primary mechanism for achieving the cooperation between and 
among coastal states and fishing nations that is essential for the effective management of 
international fisheries.207 As established above, RFMOs have competence or functional 
jurisdiction from UNCLOS, where they are charged with  establishment the conservation and 
management measures on the basis in particular of scientific advice. This competence is 
modelled on part of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living 
Resources of the High Seas do not really address the inherent weaknesses of the high seas fishing 
regime, especially article 119 of UNCLOS.208 It is Churchill and Lowe‘s contention that the only 
way in which ―meaningful management of high-seas fisheries is possible is through international 
co-operation, especially through Regional Fishery Commissions.‖209  
 
The first RFMOs date back to the start of the century but the majority of them have been set up 
in the last forty years. The development of their role is closely linked with the growing awareness 
                                                          
202
 Kristina M Gjerde ―High Seas Fisheries Management under the Convention on the Law of the Sea‖ in David 
Freestone et al (ed) The Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 281-307, 292. 
203
 Maria Gavouneli Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 
2007) pp 107. 
204
 Ibid. 
205
 See Chapter IV of this thesis: IUU Fishing. 
206
 Denzil G.M. Miller, Sustainable Southern Ocean Fisheries: A Model of Responsibility? (Remarks on Award of WWF 
Duke of Edinburgh Conservation Medal, Buckingham Palace, London. 17 October 2007). 
207
 Michael Lodge, Managing International Fisheries: Improving Fisheries Governance by Strengthening Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations [2007] (Chatham House, London, March 2007. Energy, Environment and Development 
Programme - EEDP BP 07/01). 
208
 R.R. Churchill and A.V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd Edition. Juris Publishing, Manchester, UK. 1999) p297. 
209
 Ibid. 
41 
 
of the need for fish stocks to be managed on a sustainable basis.210 For most part RFMOs have 
been little more than advisory institutions. However since the 1970s with a growing awareness of 
the need for a more sustainable approach to fishing, RFMOs began to undertake management 
tasks which included the adoption of conservation measures.211  
 
The range of RFMOs is very varied. Some were set up under the FAO and others quite 
independently of that organisation.212 Of the former, a number are purely consultative and have 
no administrative organisation of their own (e.g. CECAF) while others have management powers 
and autonomous structures and budgets (e.g. IOTC).213 Some are concerned with all biological 
resources in the area for which they are responsible (e.g. NAFO or CCAMLR).214 Others focus 
on a stock or group of stocks like tuna (e.g. CCSBT or ICCAT).215 Their geographical area of 
competence may be limited to the high seas or include the high seas and the exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs) of coastal States on account of the biological unity of the stocks. Many 
commentators argue that it is this variation in form and function has been a major factor in the 
perception that RFMOs are ad hoc institutions unable to undertake its high seas management 
function which in accordance with UNCLOS. Denzil Miller writes; 216 
―Drawing largely on common sense, it follows that negative outcomes from any management action or lack thereof, are 
confounded by increased risk due to uncertainty of purpose, function or form.‖ 
 
So far, by most accounts, RFMOs have so far failed to live up to their promise – there are very 
few examples of RFMOs sustainably managing their target stocks.217 For example; one RFMO, 
ICCAT [International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna] has been so ineffective at 
conservation tuna stocks that critics of ICCAT express the ineffectiveness of the RFMO by 
deriding the acronym and calling it the International Conspiracy to Catch All Tuna. Rummiger argues 
that recently ―ICCAT lived up to that derisive nickname by setting 2011 catch levels for Atlantic 
bluefin tuna at basically the same levels as 2010 - 12,900 tons, down from 13,500 - despite the 
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pleas of conservation scientists and the bluefin's place on the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature's "Red List" of endangered or critically endangered species.‖218 
 
Many commentators argue that RFMOs are ineffective primarily because although they have 
express functional jurisdiction to allocate catches, and propose conservation measures,219 they 
lack the requisite prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction to see them through. Furthermore, 
they lack these ‗hard‘ jurisdictions in the face of a declaration of exclusive flag state jurisdiction 
over vessels that fly the flag of that state.  
 
 
 
RFMO powers include, in addition to technical measures (such as mesh sizes and minimum sizes 
for fish), the fixing on a regular basis of the TAC and the rules for their allocation among the 
contracting parties. 220 Although many accuse RFMOs of ascertaining the TAC based on the 
maximum sustainable yield. Miller argues that ―managing target stocks to ensure maximum 
sustainable yield is the bare minimum [that RFMOs and States] should be striving for.‖221 
Increasingly, RFMOs have management machinery (monitoring of catches, statistical 
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programmes, monitoring of trade flows) that enables them to monitor contracting parties' 
implementation of conservation measures.222 RFMOs also have competence to inspect, control 
and put vessels under surveillance to verify compliance by the contracting parties.223 The most 
important feature of RFMO measures is that once they are adopted, they are binding on their 
members. Furthermore these measures also become mandatory for contracting parties which 
have not exercised the right to object normally provided for in the regulations of the RFMOs.224 
 
RFMOs then have competence enough for contracting parties or members who are compliant 
with the measures set, or are able to influence RFMOs through the supply of scientific data. But 
what of flagged RFMO members who don‘t follow the rules? And what if they are from member 
states that are lax in their enforcement of RFMO measures on their flagged vessels? RFMOs are 
then forced to rely of Flag State Jurisdiction, and as Gavouneli points out – ―the defects of flag 
state jurisdiction are well known.‖225 And then there are those who re-flag their vessels to States 
that are not party to any RFMO agreement?226  
 
The EU Trade commission argues that the ―increasingly binding nature of the management 
measures adopted by the RFMOs may in fact encourage certain ship owners to reflag their 
vessels to flags of other countries which are not members of the RFMOs.227 This IUU fishing 
behaviour of non-RFMO compliance or the re-flagging of vessels is not only tragic to the 
management of high seas fishstocks, it is tragic for small RFMO compliant States that rely on 
RFMOs and international co-operation to protect their livelihood. Jim Anderton [the then Chair 
of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee] in a statement that expressed his frustration 
at the lack of progress made at the fourth annual meeting of the WCPFC in 2007 said;228  
―[…] Overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin tuna stocks is already occurring, and urgent action is required to maintain 
these stocks above globally-accepted standards for sustainable limits […]Healthy tuna fisheries are the economic engine 
for most Pacific Island countries and, for some, these fisheries are their greatest source of income. But Pacific tuna 
fisheries have reached a critical point. The scale and intensity of fishing is ever increasing. If we don‗t address things now, 
the whole Pacific region will face huge economic issues in the long-term. The highly migratory tuna fisheries in the Pacific 
region are worth about $NZ3 billion per year. They are probably the only remaining healthy tuna stocks left on the 
planet, as most high-value tuna and tuna-like fish stocks in other oceans of the world are now seriously depleted or fast 
heading that way […] It‗s simply disingenuous of the non-Pacific fishing nations to say there is not enough information 
                                                          
222
 EUTC, ―International Fisheries Governance‖ [2007] EU Trade Commission Document p 3; see also Charlotte De 
Fontaubert & Indrani Lutchman (Eds), Achieving sustainable fisheries: implementing the new international legal regime (IUCN - 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Cambridge, UK. 2003). Chapter 5, pp 44-
54.  
223
 See the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing. C 2009/REP Corr. 3, Report of the Thirty-sixth Session of the FAO Conference on Fisheries, FAO (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) Rome, 18-23 November 2009.  
224
 EUTC, ―International Fisheries Governance‖ [2007] EU Trade Commission Document ; see also Charlotte De 
Fontaubert & Indrani Lutchman (Eds), Achieving sustainable fisheries: implementing the new international legal regime (IUCN - 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Cambridge, UK. 2003). Chapter 5, pp 44-
54.  
225
 Maria Gavouneli Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 
2007) pp 107. 
226
 See Chapter IV(B) of this thesis entitled IUU Fishing: Open Registries and Flags of Convenience.   
227
 EUTC, ―International Fisheries Governance‖ [2007] EU Trade Commission Document, p 3. 
228
 Jim Anderton, ―Distant nations block tuna conservation measures‖ [2007] Pesca2.com, New Zealand Ministry of 
Fisheries Press Release, 12/12/2007. 
44 
 
on which to base conservation measures […] The aim of the proposed measures is to reduce the impact on juvenile bigeye 
and yellowfin tuna from large purse-seining vessels, and to reduce catches of adult bigeye tuna by longline vessels.‖ 
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IV ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED & UNREGULATED 
(“IUU”) FISHING 
 
 ―An old spectre haunts fisheries management today: governance without government.‖229 
 
This provocative statement clearly illustrates how many commentators view the state of 
management of fishing on the high seas. Humankind‘s efforts are perceived by many to be 
failing despite the successful completion of a codified body of International Law in UNCLOS 
which itself flowed from general customary international law. Instead we have a high seas regime 
that is dominated by two unequivocal freedoms that are steeped in international political history; 
the freedom to fish on the high seas230 and the exclusive flag state jurisdiction over vessels flying 
their flag.231 In the face of more and more fisheries being affected by the heavy demand more for 
fish to fill supermarket refrigerators, and in the face of increased international demands to meet 
that demand sustainably, ―irresponsible operators have taken advantage of prevailing circumstances to optimise 
their own economic advantages, often to the detriment of the stocks concerned and at the expense of their more 
responsible competitors.‖232 This ‗tragedy of the commons‘233 has been a source of concern and has 
resulted in a game of cat and mouse between irresponsible fishers and the rest of the 
international community.234 Fishing inconsistently with international measures is essentially 
―irresponsible‖, because it undermines the sustainable management of fisheries and marine 
ecosystems and also the improvement of ocean governance.235 Combating this ―irresponsible‖ 
fishing on the high seas which has since been termed IUU fishing236 has come to preoccupy 
many RFMOs who are charged with not only managing fishstocks for responsible fishers but 
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with coming up with new ways to ensure compliance by those irresponsible IUU fishers who 
circumvent regulatory controls.237 Rachel Baird points out; 238 
 ―[That] where flag States are either unwilling or unable to exercise effective control over their flagged fishing vessels, the 
existing law of the sea, with the exception of specific provisions in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, does not permit third 
State enforcement. The resultant lacuna in international law whereby fishers can operate in an environment lacking 
effective regulation in which RFMOs and coastal States (beyond their EEZs) have no direct enforcement powers to 
prevent non-member States or third States from fishing unsustainably, has contributed to the growth of IUU fishing.‖ 
 
A IUU FISHING ON THE HIGH SEAS 
(i) What is IUU Fishing? 
 
As we have already ascertained above IUU fishing is a manifestation of Hardin‘s tragedy of the 
commons as a response to attempts by some states and RFMOs to implement a system of 
governance over the high seas fisheries, by fishing inconsistently with the proposed measures. 
IUU fishing is not only a serious global problem it is one of the principal impediments to the 
achievement of sustainable world fisheries. It represents a major loss of revenue globally, 
particularly for poorer countries like our pacific neighbours, where there is a strong dependency 
on fisheries for food and livelihoods.239 An OECD Report regards IUU Fishing as a serious 
global threat;240  
―Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing is a worldwide problem, affecting both domestic waters and the high seas, 
and all types of fishing vessels, regardless of their size or gear. Not only is it harmful to current global fish stocks, it also 
undermines the effectiveness of measures adopted nationally, regionally and internationally to secure and rebuild fish 
stocks for the future. By undermining effective management systems, IUU fishing activities not only generate harmful 
effects on economic and social welfare, but also reduce incentives to comply with rules.‖ 
But what is exactly is IUU fishing? The term IUU was first coined in 1997 by CCAMLR, ―where 
it was used to describe unauthorised fishing for Patagonian toothfish in the CCAMLR 
Convention Area by non-contracting parties as well as undeclared or misreported catches by 
CCAMLR members.‖241 
 
However the best description of what IUU fishing is, is to be found in the first chapter of the 
IPOA-IUU which was drafted and implemented in 2000 following the FAO Ministerial Meeting 
on Fisheries where States adopted the Rome Declaration on the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, which declared the intention of its subscribers to ―develop a global plan 
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of action to deal effectively with all forms of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing including 
fishing vessels flying flags of convenience.‖242  
 
Chapter II of the IPOA-IUU accurately defines IUU Fishing:243 
 Illegal fishing refers to activities: 
o Conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that 
State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; 
o Conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management 
organisation but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that 
organisation and by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or 
o In violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a 
relevant regional fisheries management organisation. 
 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: 
o Which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of 
national laws and regulations; or 
o Undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organisation which have not been 
reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the reporting procedures of that organisation. 
 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: 
o In the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organisation that are conducted by vessels 
without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to that organisation, or by a fishing entity, in a 
manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organisation; 
or 
o In areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures and 
where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of 
living marine resources under international law. 
 
The table below simplifies the IPOA-IUU definition somewhat & simply shows the variety of 
IUU Fisheries –244 
 
So in summary, illegal fishing on the high seas is committed by vessels flagged to members of 
an RFMO (including cooperating non-parties) but which operate in violation of the rules 
established by the RFMO [On the EEZ it is committed by vessels engaging in unauthorised foreign fishing 
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within EEZs]; unreported fishing on the high seas is committed when a catch is misreported or 
not reported to national authorities or RFMOs [On the EEZ it is misreported or not reported catches by 
foreign vessels within EEZs]; & unregulated fishing on the high seas is committed by stateless 
vessels or vessels flagged to non-members of RFMOs outside the rules of the RFMO.245 
Furthermore it must be borne in mind that IUU fishing involves ―complex webs of actions and 
entities and is not limited to the illegal harvesting of fish but also includes the shipment, 
processing, landing, sale and distribution of fish and fishery products.‖246 Support and 
provisioning of vessels and providing financing are also part of what Gueye terms the ―IUU 
continuum.‖ 247 
 
IUU fishing is an enormous problem, and presents a major obstacle to achieving sustainable 
fisheries and effective fish stock management on the high seas. Preventing IUU fishing provides 
an enormous challenge to national, regional and international bodies attempting to manage 
fisheries.248 
 
(ii) What is the impact of IUU Fishing? 
The biological and ecological impacts of IUU fishing are self-evident.249 We have already 
established that IUU fishing emphasises the fragility and threatens the sustainability of high seas 
fishstocks and undermines RFMO measures that are put in place to conserve those stocks. 250 It 
is common knowledge that the modern commercial fishing vessel is most often a trawler — ―a 
large ship that pulls weighted nets along the seafloor, destroying all flora and fauna in its path.‖251 
This trawling is one of the ways IUU activities has adverse effects on the marine ecosystem as a 
whole, notably the populations of seabirds, marine mammals, sea turtles and bio-diversity in 
general, with colossal by catch, and the targeting of species like krill. 252 Also what is important 
about IUU Fishing is that its effects are more impacting because the behaviour is difficult to 
monitor, and so any attempt at monitoring fishstocks based on amounts of landed fish by 
RFMO compliant vessels is almost impossible. Furthermore the uncertainty that is added to the 
calculation of the MSY, coupled with the need to use the precautionary approach will put even 
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more pressure on compliant fishers.253 Arguably in this way an RFMO may not even know that a 
fishstock is in danger until the stock is in a dire condition.254 It is in this way that IUU over-fishing 
will eventually facilitate total fishstock collapse.255 
The social-economic impacts of IUU fishing are both short term and long term and direct and 
indirect. The short-term economic impacts of IUU fishing are less fish for compliant the fisher 
which means less employment (both fishing and processing), lower incomes and lower export 
revenues.256 Longer-term impacts may be more serious as target stocks become overexploited 
and legal fisheries have to stop operating due to fishery collapse.257 Of the direct impacts the 
most important include diminished fisheries‘ contributions to the gross domestic product (by the 
amount of IUU fishing) as well as impacts on employment, port and export revenues, fees and 
taxes.  While direct losses may be quantifiable, indirect effects are equally important even if they 
are more difficult to ascertain. The social costs associated with IUU fishing are significant; IUU 
fishing has an adverse impact on the livelihoods of fishing communities, particularly in 
developing countries.258 The follow on effects are such that the lack of income from smaller 
‗legal‘ catches results in fishers plying the high seas for a catch often in inadequate safety 
conditions. Ultimately IUU fishing threatens the survival of coastal communities in developing 
countries and jeopardizes the viability of much relied upon resources. 259 ―The important message 
emerging from this is that IUU impacts are often far greater than what can be measured.‖260 
 
(iii) What are the Drivers of IUU Fishing? 
The central premise of this dissertation is that over-fishing and IUU fishing on the high seas 
began when UNCLOS enclosed 90% of the best fishing zones under coastal state jurisdiction in 
EEZs in accordance with norms that stretch back to the Roman application of res nullius and 
applying the contrary doctrine of res communis to the high seas,261 which is confounded by strong 
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Grotius freedoms to navigate and fish262 reasserted in UNCLOS alongside comparably weak flag 
state obligations of co-operation with coastal state conservation measures for the preservation of 
fish stocks.263 With the reassertion of the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction over flagged 
vessels – there is arguably nothing [save political will and a sense of conservation and 
sustainability] to procure flag state compliance with any measures implemented by RFMOs. 
Therefore arguably IUU fishing on the high seas is fundamentally driven by the in failure of 
governments to comply with RFMOs and impose proper limits on permissible catches of fish.264  
Yet according to Baird there are a myriad of factors that contribute to the increased harvesting 
of global marine fishstocks and the emergence of IUU fishing; including; 265 
 ―The impact of the industrialisation of the fishing industry [that is mechanisation and improved spotting and catching 
technology, snap freezing, and the advent of super-trawlers]; increases in both human consumption and the size of the 
global fishing fleet; the introduction of government subsidies which have contributed to the creation of an artificial 
environment of profitability; increased competition amongst fishers and the entry of large scale commercial fishing entities 
into the marine fishing industry.‖ 
A Economic and Social Drivers  
However as we have already established ―high economic returns‖ of regulated fish is a significant 
driver of IUU fishing, coupled with a ―low risk of apprehension‖ – IUU fishing becomes an 
attractive undertaking to many vessels who ply the high seas in search of a living.  
―IUU fishing persists because it pays.‖266 IUU fishing activities can be extremely profitable due 
to lower cost structures than for compliant fishing activities.267 Furthermore the fish targeted on 
the high seas by IUU fishers, in general, have a very high market value.268 These two factors 
provide a high incentive for IUU fishing.  There are also social costs associated with IUU fishing 
which has an enormous effect on fishing communities, particularly in developing countries, 
where many of the crew on IUU fishing vessels are from underdeveloped countries who can‘t 
afford to be RFMO compliant.269 These socio-economic drivers contribute to the temptation for 
vessels to re-flag to states with open registers. What‘s more there is no real sanction that works 
as a disincentive to re-flag. 
There are significant economic incentives which attract transnational investment in what has 
become a multi-million dollar business. The problem of IUU fishing cannot be completely 
eradicated until the economic incentives are removed. 
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Fishing vessel over capacity 
There are simply ―too many fishing boats chasing too few fish.‖270 According to Stokke 
―overcapacity aggravates the problem of IUU operations in at least three ways‖;271 
 It reduces the opportunity and profitability of legal operations;  
 The periodic idleness associated with it provides incentives for individual vessel 
owners to pursue IUU options; and  
 Overcapacity drives down the price of vessels, especially second-hand vessels but 
presumably new ones as well, thereby reducing the overall costs of illegitimate (as 
well as legitimate) harvesting operations. 
Subsidies 
Subsidies play a huge role in fishing depletion. It is ironic that the world‘s most depleted fisheries 
seem to be in the waters that are dominated by fleets from countries with the largest fishery 
subsidy programmes.272 These subsidies are designed to be an incentive for fishers to stay at 
home273, but instead they are used in ‗gear modernisation programmes‘, ‗boat buy-back schemes‘ 
and the improvement in fishing technology which serve to increase fishing capacity.274 When 
these new ‗super-trawlers‘ funded with subsidies do go out and fish, they have a far more 
significant impact of fishstocks, because they can take so much at one time. 
Lack of Penalties and Sanctions  
The size of penalties and the risk of being apprehended is not generally a sufficient deterrent to 
IUU fishing activities.275 This is compounded by re-flagged vessels who re-register (or ‗flag-hop‘) 
in countries that have largely non-compliant ‗open registers‘ to get around RFMO restrictions.276 
These vessels flying ‗flags of convenience‘ don‘t consider themselves subject to RFMO 
compliance.277  The lack of harmonisation of penalties across countries is also a concern.278  
Although the normative principles enshrined in UNCLOS that enable fishing vessels virtually 
unfettered freedom to fish the high seas in the face of RFMO measures are the primary driver of 
IUU fishing, other economic and political factors have also promoted IUU fishing. However the 
promise of ―high financial returns with a low exposure to risk in an environment of increased 
competition amongst legitimate fishers for the dwindling high seas fish stocks is an attractive 
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business proposition for both out of work fishers and corporate entities.‖279 Therefore it follows 
that controlling the ‗marketability‘ of IUU fish and removing the economic incentive from 
landed IUU fish in favour of landed ‗legal‘ fish at ports could have a significant impact on the 
proliferation of IUU fishing. 
B OPEN REGISTRIES AND FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 
One of the key issues, if not the key issue in addressing IUU fishing, is the need to achieve more 
effective flag State control,280 Since article 94 of UNCLOS states quite unequivocally that ―every 
state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control […] over ships flying its flag.‖281 This robust principle 
as we have established throughout this thesis leaves coastal states almost powerless to ensure 
flag-state compliance without the consent of the flag state, and totally unable to enforce its 
measures directly on that flagged vessel. In the absence of an express reference to the superiority 
of coastal state rights over those of high seas fishing states, freedom of high seas fishing 
prevails.282 This presumption that a state will implement laws to govern and control ships flying 
its flag, in addition to fisheries treaties; the enforcement of generally accepted regulations, 
procedures and practices (eg IMO conventions and guidelines) and ILO standards for workers 
and seafarers – has lead to ‗flags of convenience‘ where flag state compliance measures are 
relaxed and even the establishment of open registers283 where these FOC can be purchased. It has 
been estimated that there are over 1200 vessels that are registered to these FOCs which include; 
Belize, Honduras, Panama, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Equatorial Guinea, all known as 
flag of convenience States.284 Other States with open registers include: the Seychelles, Vanuatu, 
Sao Tome and Principe, the Netherlands Antilles, Togo and Russia.285 
 
Re-flagging is relatively easy, and IUU vessels may re-flag several times in a fishing season to 
confuse management and surveillance authorities.286 Agnew provides an example of a vessel; San 
Rafael 1, that reflagged a number of times not only to confuse surveillance authorities, but also 
to get around the CCAMLR rules.  According to Agnew the San Rafael 1, flagged to Belize [a 
well known FOC], which, following an encounter with a fisheries patrol vessel in December 
1999 around South Georgia - changed its name to the Sil, then the Anyo Maru 22 and finally the 
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Amur, flagged to Saõ Tome e Principe [another known FOC] before sinking around Kerguelen 
on 9 October 2000. 287 
 
 
 
The phenomenon known as FOC is a major contributing factor to the prevalence of IUU 
fishing.288 Furthermore with respect to fisheries management, FOC States typically do very little 
to enforce international obligations they have incurred in relation to flagged vessels fishing the 
high seas, furthermore they are usually not members of relevant RFMOs.289 Therefore given the 
large number of IUU fishing vessels flying FOC, rather than relying on RFMOs that have little 
jurisdiction over non-member FOC vessels, it would seem that the most effective means of 
eliminating the problem of IUU fishing would be to eliminate the FOC system completely for 
fishing vessels.290 But How? Because UNCLOS places the duty directly on flag states to enforce 
compliance, many states that rely on flagging vessels as a source of state revenue, know that 
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coastal states are powerless to exercise their jurisdiction over vessels.291  It is these lacunae within 
the UNCLOS regime that not only propagate IUU fishing, but also protect FOCs.292  
 
Gianni argues that that what is needed is a clear ruling from the ITLOS ―designed to further 
strengthen the definition of flag state responsibility under international law and ultimately render 
the state practice of issuing flags of convenience for fishing vessels effectively illegal.‖293 
Although its seems that this maybe unlikely in the near future, given not only due to the robust 
unequivocal consensual nature of the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction, but also the 
nature of the rulings by ITLOS on the issue of ‗a genuine link between flagged vessel and flagged state.‘294 
In an ITLOS test case; the M/V Saiga Case (1999)295 – that involved the M/V Saiga296, an oil 
tanker supplying gas to fishing vessels off the West African coast that was arrested by Guinean 
authorities. In an objection to the arrest by St. Vincent (the flag state) being a breach of 
International law, Guinea subsequently objected, inter alia, to the objection on the grounds of an 
absence of a genuine link between the M/V Saiga and its flag state. The tribunal found;297 
―The conclusion of the Tribunal is that the purpose of the provisions of the [1982 UN] Convention on the need for a 
genuine link between a ship and its flag state is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag state, and 
not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag state may be challenged by 
other states.  
―There is nothing in article 94 to permit a state which discovers evidence indicating the absence of proper jurisdiction and 
control by a flag state over a ship to refuse to recognize the right of the ship to fly the flag of the flag state‖ 
 
This case illustrates the unwillingness of ITLOS to hold inconsistently with UNCLOS. D‘Andrea 
focuses on the robust nature of the ‗exclusive flag state jurisdiction norm by recalling Herman 
Meyers‘ as expressed back in 1967 in The Nationality of Ships‘ where ―one might be more successful in 
focusing on the ultimate purpose of the genuine link principle, namely safeguarding the necessary authority of the 
flag state in the best possible manner‖.298 
 
IUU fishing activities is a significant international problem that represents a tragedy of the 
commons, not only because such activities are harmful to global fish stocks but also because 
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IUU fishing seeks to undermine the effectiveness of measures that could curtail the tragedy – 
measures that are adopted nationally, regionally and internationally to secure fish stocks for the 
future.299 Despite many actions that have been taken by the international policy makers, IUU 
fishing is still rampant. Clearly the reasons are economic and IUU fishers, when confronted with 
new limitations or regulations on their operations, will explore alternative ways of continuing 
with their fishing.300  
 
The role of RFMOs and the fight against IUU fishing could be greatly enhanced, if current non-
members could be encouraged to join the relevant RFMO. However as we are aware RFMOs 
themselves also require legislative strengthening in order to respond to ongoing concerns. 
UNCLOS lacks the tools to provide RFMOs with greater competence and enforcement 
jurisdiction required to move beyond flag state jurisdiction and actively enforce conservation and 
sustainable measure on the high seas against IUU vessels. Another major issue in relation to 
RFMO measure enforcement ―is that international legal frameworks apply only to states that 
have acceded to various conventions.‖301 And so what of RFMO rules that must be implemented 
through national authorities? The RFMOs have an essential role to play in the quest to stop 
illegal fishing. But where RFMOs are challenged, in addition to enforcement, is regulation 
implementation.302 There is a clear need for RFMOs to monitor the implementation of 
resolutions and achieved results. His will be addressed in the next chapter has we look at the 
development of international legislative tools designed to give RFMOs more implementative 
clout.  
 
Perhaps the most important notion to keep in mind is that as long as the IUU activity is 
profitable (or more likely that when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs) it is not 
easy to stop.303 Couple this with no real ability for sanction other than flag state control – it 
seems that IUU Fishing will not be eliminated anytime soon. 
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V SUBSEQUENT INTERNATIONAL & REGIONAL 
INITIATIVES THAT ADDRESS IUU FISHING 
Part VII of UNCLOS designates the high seas as ―open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked‖ 
including ―freedom of fishing,‖304 but obliges fishing States to co-operate to conserve highly 
migratory and straddling fish stocks, or to observe treaties and coastal state conservation 
measures.305 Some states formed regional and sub-regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs)306 
to facilitate co-operation in conservation and manage fish stocks on the high seas. This includes 
the general duty to cooperate with regard to straddling stocks, highly migratory stocks, and 
particular species.307  Yet at the same time UNCLOS has (unintentionally) ‗hobbled‘ those 
organisations that recommends states parties cooperate to establish,308 by promulgating the principle 
of exclusive flag state jurisdiction over flagged vessels on the high seas. And so with this 
principle and in the absence of an express reference to the superiority of RFMO rights over 
those of high seas fishing states, freedom of high seas fishing prevails.309  
It is obvious that UNCLOS qualified the freedom of fishing on the high seas with an obligation 
to co-operate to conserve fishstocks, because it presumed that fishing states will implement laws 
to govern and control ships flying its flag, including in addition to fisheries treaties; i.e. the 
enforcement of generally accepted regulations, procedures and practices (eg IMO conventions 
and guidelines) and ILO standards for workers and seafarers.310 However as we have established 
earlier in this thesis, this is not the case at all. The principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction has 
among other things, lead to the reflagging of vessels with ‗flags of convenience‘ to states where 
flag state compliance measures are relaxed. This in turn led to the proliferation of ‗open registers‘ 
where these flags of convenience can be purchased. Because UNCLOS places the duty directly on 
flag states to enforce compliance, many states that rely on flagging vessels as a source of state 
revenue, know that coastal states are powerless to exercise their jurisdiction over vessels.311 It is 
lacunae like this within the UNCLOS regime that have helped the proliferation of IUU fishing.312 
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Furthermore, since the negotiation began in the 1970s in UNCLOS III until the convention 
came into force in the early 1990s – the nature of fishing, as well as the fisheries management has 
evolved. Today‘s fisheries has different problems (greater fishing and spotting technology, 
FADs313 and supertrawlers – and in response to this the fisheries management paradigm has 
evolved to include more environmental principles and the promotion of transparency and 
accountability, texts of international fisheries instruments has even extended participation to 
NGOs.‖314 It therefore follows that the meagre requirements of co-operation and conservation 
between high seas fishing states and coastal states with regard to fishstocks laid down by 
UNCLOS is not enough, yet that is as far as the convention went in establishing meaningful high 
seas fisheries management regime.315 When these meagre principles are added to the robust 
principles of free fishing and flag state jurisdiction, we have a disincentive for flag States to 
regulate their fishing vessels on the high seas. This disincentive is buttressed further by RFMOs 
and coastal states being precluded from preventing any action from being taken against those 
flagged vessels [who flout high seas conservation measures that are in accordance with 
UNCLOS] without there being any adverse consequences for the flag state concerned.316 
Goodman argues that it is imperative that states establish the criteria or elements of effective flag 
state responsibility – which she argues should address;317 
―Address the need for effective cooperative management of shared resources, and the effective control of fishing operations 
through the prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU fishing.‖ 
None of these requirements are covered, or even hinted at in UNCLOS - ―which does not 
incorporate detailed requirements for the management of high seas fisheries, or the conduct of 
fishing on the high seas.‖ 318 Haward argues that it is the above problems coupled with problems 
in managing Straddling Stocks in the early 1990s (particularly the Cod Fisheries off the Canadian 
Atlantic Grand Banks), and perceptions of over-fishing or even ‗illegal‘ fishing by DWFNs 
prompted many states (like Canada) to convene a number of meetings even before the 
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commencement of the UNCED (properly known as the Earth Summit).319 For instance, in May 
1992 an International Conference on Responsible Fishing was held at Cancun, Mexico and there 
the Cancun declaration was adopted which called on the FAO to draft an International Code of 
Conduct on Responsible fishing.320 The UNCED met in June 1992, at Rio and here they adopted 
the Rio Declaration or Agenda 21. Chapter 17 of the declaration deals with the Earth‘s Oceans 
and ―Sustainable Use and Conservation of Marine Living Resources of the High Seas.‖321 It is 
arguable that it is this declaration that really got the ball rolling in the context of ensuring 
sustainable management of the high seas fisheries. Accordingly the FAO took the initiative to fill 
the holes in the UNCLOS duties to conserve and co-operate and ‗responded to Cancun 
declaration after a conference of their own in 1992‘322, with two instruments:  
 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. (Rome, 24 November 1993) (―Compliance 
Agreement‖)  
 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, (Dec 4, 1995) (―UNFSA or Fish Stocks 
Agreement‖) 
Both the Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish Stock Agreement are legally binding 
international instruments,323 and both instruments have developed an international governance 
framework for high seas fishing that gives effect to the duty to cooperate through a system of 
RFMOs
324 and at the same time they establish the criteria or elements of effective flag state 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the international fishery conservation and 
management measures adopted by RFMOs.325 Simply put, these two new agreements add meat 
to UNCLOS‘s bones in the context of high Seas fisheries management in that they ―enunciate a 
range of flag State duties that give specific practical effect to the obligation to ensure effective jurisdiction and control 
in relation to the activities of fishing vessels.‖326 In the very least these two agreements compliment 
UNCLOS, but some commentators like Goodman even go as far as to say together – the two 
agreements are implementing agreements.  
Also in subsequent years in response to IUU fishing and FOCs two soft law instruments have 
also entered into force; 
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 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations. Rome, 1995. (―Code of Conduct‖)  
 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) 
Rome, 2001. (―IPOA-IUU‖) 
The Code of Conduct and the IPOA-IUU are voluntary and management-oriented in nature and 
are ―formulated to be interpreted and applied in conformity with the relevant rules of 
international law.‖327 Although each agreement is different, each one has the common purpose 
of facilitating meaningful sustainable high seas fisheries management. And although many 
commentators acknowledge the piecemeal nature of the sustainable management ‗regime‘, it can 
also be argued that the difference in nature and scope of each agreement is makes them 
essentially complementary in achieving their objective toward sustainable and responsible 
fisheries.328 
A HARD LAW INSTRUMENTS   
(i) The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
The Compliance agreement seeks to ensure that there is effective flag-state control over fishing 
vessels operating on the high seas. It was created to deter the practice of reflagging to FOCs in 
order to circumvent RFMO conservation and sustainable fishing measures.329 The Agreement 
creates a set of basic obligations requiring flag States to control the activities of their vessels on 
the high seas, including by requiring an authorization for high seas fishing (which must only be 
issued where the flag State is able to effectively control the fishing operations of the vessel),330 
and by ensuring that vessels do not undermine the effectiveness of international conservation 
and management measures.331 With respect to reflagging to FOCs – the Compliance agreement 
has trickily eliminated the problem of a ‗genuine link‘ by introducing the requirement of an 
authorization to fish on the high seas.332 Article III(3) provides that, no such authorization shall be 
granted;  
―unless the Party [to the Agreement] is satisfied that it is able, taking into account the links that exist between it and 
the fishing vessel concerned, to exercise effectively its responsibilities under this Agreement in respect of that fishing 
vessel‖. 
Article III(3) thus imposes a condition that fulfils the same objective as genuine link – the 
authorization to fish ―expresses the intent of the flag state to exercise control over fishing vessels 
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entitled to fly its flag‖.333 D‘Andrea also argues that the authorization to fish on the high seas raises 
awareness of flag state responsibility.334 Furthermore the Compliance Agreement seeks to 
maximise information flow about high seas fishing activities, the lack of which has been an 
obstacle to effective fishing management in the past.335 In order to achieve this, the Agreement 
provides that the flag State must maintain records of registered vessels that were granted an 
authorization to fish on the high seas and communicate to FAO information on the vessel, its 
owner and manager, the fishing method, the gross registered tonnage, and other relevant data 
about its vessels authorised to fish on the High Seas.336 Furthermore the Compliance Agreement 
allows a port State ‗to promptly notify the flag state‘ if it has ‗reasonable grounds for believing 
that a fishing vessel has been used for an activity that undermines the effectiveness of 
international conservation and management measures.‘337  
However, even though this agreement is legally binding on its signees, the effectiveness of the 
Agreement still comes down to the goodwill of flag states. The agreement itself provides for no 
sanction of a flag state in the case of non-compliance nor arguably does it have the jurisdiction 
to ever do so.338 
 
(ii) The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)339 
The UNFSA complements the Compliance Agreement and the voluntary 1995 FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. However Gavouneli claims that the UNFSA is a much more 
effective tool for the management of high Seas fisheries – (yet at the same time she 
acknowledges that this effectiveness is also its weakness). She writes;340 
―… The 1995 Agreement is neither an implementation agreement to the LOS Convention nor an amendment thereof 
in spite of the mandate given to the diplomatic conference that created it and the result being celebrated as a carefully 
crafted compromise – it simply goes beyond the confines of the LOS Convention and creates another legal universe, 
naturally binding only upon those States party to it. Indeed, it is explicitly so stated in [the Agreement].‖ 
The influence of the Compliance Agreement is recognisable in many of the provisions of the 
UNFSA: ensuring vessels‘ comply with conservation and management measures; the granting of 
authorisations to fish on the high seas conditional on the state‘s ability to effectively exercise its 
responsibilities in respect of the fishing vessel; and the maintenance of a national record of 
                                                          
333
 J. Fitzpatrick, ―Measures to Enhance the Capability of a Flag State to Exercise Effective Control over a Fishing 
Vessel‖ in Report of and Papers Presented at the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, (Sydney, 
Australia, 15-19 May 2000, FAO Fisheries Report No. 666 (2001)). 
334
 Ariella D‘Andrea, ―The ―genuine link‖ concept in responsible fisheries: Legal aspects and recent developments‖ 
[2006] FAO Legal Papers Online #61 (November 2006). 
335
 R.R. Churchill and A.V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd Edition. Juris Publishing, Manchester, UK. 1999) p 303. 
336
 Ibid, 304. 
337
 Compliance Agreement, Article V(2).   
338
 Ariella D‘Andrea, ―The ―genuine link‖ concept in responsible fisheries: Legal aspects and recent 
developments‖[2006] FAO Legal Papers Online #61 (November 2006) pp 9 -10. 
339
 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec 4, 1995, 
A/CONF.164/37, 8 September 1995, 34 ILM 1542; Malcolm D. Evans, International Law (3rd Edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) p 683 at n68: The UNFSA entered into force in December 2001, having secured 30 
reservations. By 2010 seventy-seven states and other entities (including the E.U.) have become party to it. 
340
 Maria Gavouneli Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 
2007) p 120. 
61 
 
fishing vessels. 341 The UNFSA is technical and focused on procedures, stakeholder involvement, 
transparency, the use of science and the application of the precautionary approach. Articles 9 and 
10 of the Agreement outline the scope and functions of RFMOs including the management 
functions of collecting and assessing scientific information, and establishing and enforcing 
regulatory measures.342 The UNFSA provides RFMOs with a number of key functions including 
the development of participatory rights that include ‗allocation of allowable catches or levels of 
fishing effort.‘343 Even though as we have established above, vary considerably in practise, and 
have become a contentious issue. Also with respect to RFMOs, in a manner more obligatory 
than UNCLOS the UNFSA provides that in regard to Highly Migratory fishstocks, state co-
operation is mandatory, and for straddling stocks the co-operation is desirable.344 
Where the UNFSA breaks new ground are in its compliance and enforcement measures. For 
example, article 18 of the Agreement provides strengthened flag state duties;345 
―1. A State whose vessels fish on the high seas shall take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that vessels flying 
its flag comply with subregional and regional conservation and management measures and that such vessels do not engage 
in any activity which undermines the effectiveness of such measures. 
2. A State shall authorize the use of vessels flying its flag for fishing on the high seas only where it is able to exercise 
effectively its responsibilities in respect of such vessels under the Convention and this Agreement 
3. Measures to be taken by a State in respect of vessels flying its flag shall include: 
    (a) control of such vessels on the high seas by means of fishing licences, authorizations or permits, in accordance with 
any applicable procedures agreed at the subregional, regional or global level; 
    (b) establishment of regulations:…‖ 
Furthermore, the compliance and enforcement provisions with the UNFSA346 provide that states 
will ensure their flagged vessels will comply with regional and sub-regional measures and that 
states shall enforce such measures irrespective of where violations occur.347 Furthermore it 
provides that any such breaches by a flagged vessel shall be investigated and it shall ‗require its 
vessels to give information to the investigating authority regarding vessel position, catches, 
fishing gear, fishing operations and related activities in the area of alleged violation.‘ 348 These 
enforcement measures concern investigation, legal proceedings, suspension of authorization until 
compliance is secured and types of sanctions that should be inflicted to non-complying 
vessels.349 However as in UNCLOS, the compliance and enforcement provisions of UNFSA 
require flag states to take the enforcement measures against their non-complying vessels, 
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regardless of the location of violations. So again as far as enforcement goes, the UNFSA has not 
gone beyond the normative framework formalised in UNCLOS. 
The crux of UNFSA lies in paragraph 4 of article 8;350 
―Only those States which are members of such an organisation or participants in such an arrangement, or which agrees to 
apply the conservation and management measures established by such organisation or arrangement, shall have access to 
fishery resources to which those measures apply.‖ 
Here the traditional Grotius freedom of free fishing on the high seas becomes a qualified 
freedom, conditional on compliance with RFMO conservation and management measures, and it 
therefore follows that non-members of RFMOs should not fish those waters. This is an 
ambitious provision – but it raises an important question, whether non-members (third states) 
are bound by such a provision? Perhaps it might be safe to assume that implementing measures 
that affect third states, and expect those states to be bound by them, is as Gavouneli remarks, ―is 
unsustainable in International Relations.‖351 
Third States can argue that the UNFSA for example constitutes a furtherance of the principles 
promulgated in UNCLOS, namely the somewhat recent principle of co-operation which 
establishes a duty on all states to; 352 
―… Cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the 
conservation of the living resources of the high seas.‖ 
 And;353  
―States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high 
seas […They] shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living 
resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish sub-regional or regional fisheries organizations to 
this end.‖ 
A principle that qualifies the right to freely fish the high seas – but a principle that is also subject 
to the freedom of fishing on the high Seas nonetheless. Furthermore what of States who are not 
party to the binding UNFSA – but are parties to LOSC? Well according to Gavouneli, those 
states continue to exercise ‗only flag state jurisdiction upon their vessels fishing the high seas.‘354  
Furthermore, however ambitious the above instruments – it must be highlighted that they are 
formal Instruments of Agreement (or Treaties). With respect to treaties there is a principle of 
customary [Roman] International Law; pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt,355 which is based on the 
doctrine of sovereign equality amongst all states (that all states are equally sovereign).356 This 
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principle has subsequently been codified357 and has been described as a general rule ‗so well 
established that there is no need to cite extensive authority for it‘.358  
According to Rachel Baird; 359   
―The operation of the pacta tertiis rule also exposes a weakness in international law. States may choose not to accept an 
obligation undertaken by a majority of states, sometimes benefiting from their noncompliance, as well as undermining 
attempts by the international community to regulate state practice.‖  
Or in simpler terms as Evans sees them; 360  
―States [choose] to fetter themselves, [while] many remain reluctant to do so whilst others remain free to take advantage 
of their self-restraint.‖ 
In terms of fisheries management on the high seas efforts by interested states and RFMOs at 
meaningful sustainable fishstocks management can be completely undermined by non-compliant 
third states, states the place reservations and thereby ―to avoid compliance with selected 
measures‖ (which according to Baird is a feature of many regional fisheries conventions361) or 
even worse states who sign up, and repudiate their obligations.  
In the context of deterring and or eliminating IUU fishing, the adoption of more robust 
strategies and measures that would serve to effectively tackle the problem of IUU fishing would 
have to be consented to by the very states that engage in IUU fishing.362 And what of FOCs? 
Again they would have to consent to sanctions that could otherwise be imposed by the 
international community. 
However the UNFSA does offer something that is too often overlooked by many commentators 
and that is the articulation of the precautionary approach which is in my opinion a normative 
breakthrough. Louka like many commentators emphasises the scientific evidence component of 
the UNFSA and dismisses the precautionary approach as the ―weaker version of the precautionary 
principle.‖363 However Sydnes sees it in a more positive light, and sees the UNFSA as reflecting 
the ―development of environmental principles in international co-operation, in that [when 
weighing up scientific evidence] states are to apply a precautionary approach and protect 
biodiversity when adopting regulatory measures.364 In this way the UNFSA is pro-active, rather 
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than reactive, as it would be if it just relied on scientific evidence. In addition to the introduction 
of normative environmental principles to High Seas fisheries management, the UNFSA also 
introduces port state measures, and regulates boarding and inspection on the high seas by 
members of RFMOs or parties to the Agreement, to other members of the same RFMO or 
other parties to the Agreement.365 
 
The UNFSA is a substantial improvement on the meagre UNCLOS high seas fisheries 
management provisions and in some aspects reflects some normative breakthroughs, but again it 
is still subject to the historic high seas Grotius norms that were formalised in UNCLOS. So even 
though it is apparent to many commentators that as far as the UNFSA has built on the vague 
LOSC provisions around conservation and sustainable high seas fishstock management, by 
advocating institutional requirements for RFMOs that emphasize the use of science and the 
precautionary approach to the setting of TACs, the UNFSA lacks a ―mechanism by which RFMOs 
(and States) can be held accountable for failure to comply with the norms and principles of LOSC and 
UNFSA.‖366 
B SOFT LAW INSTRUMENTS   
(i) The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
The FAO Code of Conduct was developed in response to increasing international concern for 
over-fishing and the need for action to halt the overfishing of global fish stocks. The problem of 
IUU fishing on the high seas, and the practice of re-flagging of vessels with FOCs or the 
registering vessels to open registries are contributory factors to the sad state of High Seas fishery 
resources.367 The objective of the FAO Code of Conduct is to provide guidance to States to 
create or improve the legal and institutional framework for fisheries management in order to 
achieve responsible fisheries.368 As well as fisheries management regulations, enforcement 
measures are implemented under the Code.369 The Code of Conduct is aimed at addressing flag 
state irresponsibility. This is clearly visible from the mood of the instrument. Article 7 for 
example attempts to indirectly address the FOC issue by providing that states should; 370  
―Encourage financial institutions not to require, as a condition of loans or mortgages, that vessels be registered in a state 
other than that of beneficial ownership, where such a requirement would increase the likelihood of non-compliance.‖ 
Even though the Code of Conduct is a voluntary instrument, it is still an important instrument 
for it aids in creating a new normative framework for the high seas fisheries management, by 
establishes principles and standards of behaviour applicable to the conservation, management 
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and development of all fisheries.371 What is significant about the Code of Conduct, because it is 
not a binding convention on states, but a code – its provisions are directed not only at States but 
also at industry, non-governmental organisations and other stakeholders, emphasising the need 
for ‗all stakeholders in marine fisheries to adopt a broader approach to conservation and 
management of fisheries.‘372 Like the UNFSA, the Code of conduct also emphasises the 
precautionary approach; 373  
―Where states are required to protect and preserve the marine environment by taking into account the best scientific 
evidence available. States must adopt a precautionary approach and must not use the absence of adequate scientific 
information as a reason to postpone or fail to take measures to conserve target species and associated or dependent 
species.‖ 
The Code of Conduct, even more so than the UNFSA is definitely management first – and 
addresses broader long-term fishery management issues, and requires states to adopt measures 
that can be implemented through the adoption of appropriate policy, legal, and institutional 
frameworks - mechanisms like MCS, or reductions in excess fishing capacity.374 Yet again the 
Code of Conduct might be normatively ambitious and framework building, but it suffers from 
the same weakness as the other hard law instruments – in that it relies on flag state and 
stakeholder good will. Furthermore it is not legally binding on any of the signees. It is a code – 
and by implication is only morally binding. 
 
(ii) The 2001 International Plan of Action for IUU Fishing (IPOA- IUU)  
 
Almost every commentator argues that ―given the diversity of the phenomenon we call IUU 
fishing and the multiple problems it causes, we must take a multi-tiered approach to combating 
it.‖ 375 The IPOA-IUU attacks IUU fishing with such an approach. The IPOA-IUU was 
developed from an initial expert consultation in May 2000 and two sessions of technical 
consultation.376 The second technical consultation on IUU fishing was held in Rome in February 
200, and a week later in March the IPOA was approved by COFI, who urged all its members ―to 
take the necessary steps to effectively implement‖ the plan of action.377  
 
The IPOA-IUU is not a formal agreement; instead it is more a ―toolkit‖ – complete with a set of 
tools for use in combating IUU operations on different levels. 378 In this way the IPOA-IUU is 
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an ambitious undertaking by the international community, but ultimately it is a plan of action and 
is thus non-binding in nature, and so relies on states parties to implement its measures. 
 
The purpose of the IPOA-IUU is of course to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing by 
providing countries with a set of comprehensive, effective and transparent measures on the basis 
of which they may act either directly or through the relevant RFMOs. 379  The IPOA-IUU fishing 
incorporates the following principles and strategies; 380  
―Due consideration should be given to the special requirements of developing countries in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Code of Conduct: 9.1 Participation and coordination: To be fully effective, the IPOA should be implemented by all 
States either directly, in cooperation with other States, or indirectly through relevant regional fisheries management 
organizations or through FAO and other appropriate international organizations. An important element in successful 
implementation will be close and effective coordination and consultation, and the sharing of information to reduce the 
incidence of IUU fishing, among States and relevant regional and global organizations. The full participation of 
stakeholders in combating IUU fishing, including industry, fishing communities, and non-governmental organizations, 
should be encouraged.‖ 
The IPOA-IUU is unique (like the Code of Conduct) in that it addresses the issue of 
international cooperation and the role of RFMOs in fisheries management, by promoting action 
by states at regional level. 381 Furthermore States that are not members of a relevant RFMO are 
still nonetheless under an obligation to cooperate in addressing IUU fishing, and are furthermore 
encouraged to become members of relevant RFMOs.382 
Although much of the substantive provisions of the IPOA-IUU are repetitive of what is found 
in the other instruments like the Code of Conduct, the Compliance Agreement and the UNFSA 
– its major attribute is that not only has it included many different aspects of each agreement 
into one plan of action, it has provided the international community with renewed a impetus for 
tackling the problem of high seas IUU operations.383 Also the IPOA-IUU has re-emphasized and 
elaborated on some provisions that may have lacked impact or clarity in the other instruments.  
For example, the duties of flag states are elaborated in great detail and with explicit wording, 
making provisions on vessels registration, record of fishing vessels and authorization to fish. 
Paragraph 39, for instance, reads;384 
―States should take all practicable steps, including denial to a vessel of an authorization to fish and the entitlement to fly  
that state‘s flag, to prevent "flag hopping"; that is to say, the practice of repeated and rapid changes of a vessel‘s flag for 
the purposes of circumventing conservation and management measures or provisions adopted at a national, regional or 
global level or of facilitating non-compliance with such measures or provisions‖. 
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The IPOA despite being merely a voluntary instrument provides international support for 
various types of action against fishing by flags of convenience vessels by focusing on the 
elaboration of national plans of action on measures that address the economic drivers of IUU 
fishing, including coastal State measures, port State measures, and market related measures.385 
Another provision of interest is paragraph 42 of the IPOA which requires states to collect 
information on beneficial ownership of a high seas fishing vessel, obviously aids actors in 
conducting MCS of high seas fishing vessels. Furthermore, the Plan of Action makes large use of 
coastal and port states measures in the combat against IUU fishing, and puts forth the role of 
RFMOs in international fisheries management.386 The IPOA recommends the legislating against 
the practice of IUU fishing at domestic level, it recommends imposing impose trade-related 
measures such as import bans on operators known to engage in IUU fishing. The IPOA also 
recommends the adoption of Port State Measures like CDS, VMS in order to eliminate the risk 
of trading in IUU fish.  
The IPOA represents a powerful weapon in the fight against IUU fishing, as it not only includes 
international institutions, including the OECD, also clearly have a role to play in the fight against 
IUU fishing, to develop new tools,387 it relies on the enforcement jurisdiction of port states and 
according domestic legislation, and working on the premise that even IUU fish eventually has to 
be landed.388 
The IPOA-IUU may be the first major initiative aimed solely at deterring and illuminating IUU 
fishing, but it is by no means the only one. Following the co-operative success of the IPOA-
IUU, governments have increasingly acknowledged the necessity to curb the practice of IUU 
fishing ‗economically, environmentally and socially‘ and the IPOA-IUU‘s initiative has been 
―echoed and reinforced in various international for a; which include the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (the WSSD, where governments called for the control of IUU by 
2004;389 the 2003 G8 (the Action Plan of which urged for the elimination of IUU fishing) and the 
UN General Assembly.‖390 Yet the international community has not stopped here. The OECD 
Committee for Fisheries after completing a 3-year study into the drivers and economic 
dimensions of IUU fishing, in search of alternative solutions to the problem of IUU fishing.391  
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C TRADE & PORT STATE MEASURES TO COMBAT IUU FISHING  
 
Up until now interested states have been building a high seas fisheries regime; that is largely legal; 
a piecemeal set of international legal instruments and rules that have been promulgated in 
response to the tragedy of the commons occurring on the high seas as IUU fishing – and yet the 
problem remains in full force and capacity. This thesis has established that the criteria of 
responsible flag state enforcement of RFMO measures is an international political problem just 
as much as it is an international legal problem. And what of the combating of open registries and 
FOCs? As of yet, no international instrument declares FOCs illegal, making this central problem 
to high seas fisheries management a political one. Furthermore the market that supports IUU 
fishing is undoubtedly a political-economic problem. Many commentators have urged that ‗IUU 
fishing pays‘ and removing the economic incentives would have a considerable positive effect on 
the practice. So if the problem of IUU fishing is not wholly a legal one, why has the solution so 
far been almost wholly legal in approach? It would seem that since the problem is underpinned 
by political, social and economic factors, as well as legal or normative factors, it follows that any 
solution should also be politically-economic and internationally political in scope as well as 
normative.  
 
Although RFMOs are largely powerless to enforce fisheries management measures on the high 
seas due to the principle of exclusive flag sate jurisdiction, they still have one jurisdictional 
weapon available to them – the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of coastal and port 
states. RFMOs can regulate IUU fishing on the High Seas through the use of trade measures and 
port state measures (PSM) on landed fish at their ports of their members. Even though IUU 
fishing comes down to a combination of factors that are political, economic and social as well as 
legal – RFMOs still require the comfort of competence to prescribe measures against non-
member flagged states in member Ports with reference to landed IUU fish, and have the 
jurisdiction to effectively enforce those Port State Measures (PSM) against those flagged states 
via member states through their ports. They are able to do this on the premise that ―the port 
State retains fully its sovereign right to set conditions for or even deny access to their ports.392 It 
is on this basis that UNFSA accorded port states the right and duty to take measures to promote 
enforcement of regional and global conservation and management measures.393 And with this 
competence it is no surprise that RFMOs have been changing tack and applying neo-liberal 
discourse to regulate high seas fishing practise in their member‘s ports.394  
 
Ben Sovacool looks at the use of what he terms ―input/output controls and restrictions in 
fisheries management‖, and focuses on controls commonly used by international actors to help 
manage fish stocks; competitive TAC limits, fishing restriction and prohibition zones, and 
VMS.395 He argues that on their own input/output controls and supply-side measures emphasise 
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the problems of ―political compromise in program design, the problems of enforcement and 
compliance, the incentives to fish unsustainably, and lack of standardization and information 
sharing.‖ 396 However Sovacool proposes a more holistic approach that combines more 
traditional input/output controls and supply-side measures with ―demand-side or market based 
measures‖ would better serve to ―to prevent and deter global overfishing.‖397 Some of these 
measures among others could include the elimination of fishing subsidies, the bolstering of 
import restrictions, ceasing trade in endangered and threatened fish stocks, strengthening civil 
and criminal penalties against illegal fishers, and pursuit of punitive trade sanctions against flag 
states flouting international fishery guidelines.398  
 
Trade-related and Port State measures are designed to act as a dis-incentive to engage in IUU 
fishing by attacking the profitability of IUU fishing and establishing import and export controls 
or prohibitions.399 Trade related measures in order to be effective work in tandem with port State 
measures. According to Lack, in the Traffic Report on Trade Related Measures, these measures 
reduce IUU fishing by;400 
 
 precluding or impeding access to markets for IUU product, thereby reducing profitability and, ultimately, the economic 
incentive for IUU fishing; 
 tracing the movements of fish products in order to identify those involved in catching, transhipping and marketing illegally 
caught product as a basis for imposing sanctions on those participants; 
 monitoring changes in the pattern of trade to identify flag, port and market States that can contribute to the effective 
implementation of conservation and management measures;  
 
According to the same report the trade-related measures used to achieve these objectives include: 
 
 schemes that require documentation to accompany product in order to authenticate its legitimacy (catch and/or trade 
documentation schemes); 
 schemes that rely on vessel lists that identify authorized vessels (‗white lists‘) and/or vessels considered or determined to have 
been fishing in breach of RFMO measures  (‗black lists‘) as a basis for imposing restrictions on the access of these latter vessels 
to ports through the introduction of port State measures; 
 Trade bans on particular States/entities considered to have failed to co-operate in the implementation of an RFMO‘s 
conservation and management measures. 
 
RFMOs have been using several types of port state measures for some time with success 
including MCS, vessel listings, observer participation, vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and trade 
restrictions and catch documentation schemes (CDS). 401  
One example of a measure that has shown some success is the establishment of catch and trade 
documentation scheme (CDS). Although these schemes have different names and modalities, 
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they all seek to promote ways of keeping track of ―legal‖ catches. 402 A successful CDS is that 
which was instituted by CCAMLR in 1999, which was implemented in May 2001.403 Since the 
IPOA-IUU Other RFMOs have subsequently implemented CDS.404 Some of the success of the 
CCAMLR CDS is attributed to its methodology; once a fish is caught and brought aboard a 
vessel it is subject to the CDS,405 rather than just targeting the trade of particular species of 
fish.406  
The CCAMLR CDS, which includes a mandatory Vessel Monitoring system, is binding on all its 
members.407  
The CDS has two main objectives;408  
(i) To track the landings of and the trade in Patagonian Toothfish caught within and 
adjacent to the Convention area; and 
(ii) To restrict access to international markets for Toothfish from IUU fishing in the 
Convention area. 
It also determines whether toothfish (the species that is primarily the target of IUU operations is 
CCAMLR waters) were caught in a manner consistent with CCAMLR conservation measures.409 
The CDS requires every vessel to have catch documents accompany every ‗landing, 
transshipment and importation‘ of toothfish into the territories of contracting parties.410 
CCAMLR has also managed to widen its circle of Ports by getting some non-member states to 
implement the CDS.411 The catch documents that accompany the catch contain information 
relating to the volume and location of catch, and the name and flag State of the vessel.‖412 The 
CCSBT CDS in addition to a complicated array of documents413 and require every whole fish to 
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be tagged.414 The information collected is exchanged with other members and co-operating non-
members.415 
One gauge of the success of the CCAMLR CDS is that non-CDS toothfish is reportedly fetching 
lower prices.416 However the CDS is not without its criticisms. Greenpeace argue CDS doesn‘t 
have a wide enough membership to be successful, they propose that the toothfish should be 
protected under CITES417 which has wider membership than CCAMLR.418 Furthermore Catch 
Documentation Forms are easily to fill out dishonestly and also IUU fishers will seek out and 
develop markets in non-CCAMLR countries that don‘t require CDS data.419 
Another port State measure that is implements part of the MCS component of the Compliance 
Agreement and the IPOA-IUU in order to combat IUU vessel ‗flag-hopping‘ is the use of IUU 
Vessel lists or Blacklists. Addressing the practice of ‗flag-hopping‘ the Compliance Agreement 
requires;420  
―States parties [to] exchange information amongst themselves, either directly or through the FAO, with respect to 
activities of fishing vessels flying the flags of non-parties that undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and 
management measures.‖     
Furthermore, the IPOA-IUU;421 
―States, acting through relevant regional fisheries management organizations, should take action to strengthen and 
develop innovative ways, in conformity with international law, to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing.‖ 
Some of these measures include the requirement to ―establish and cooperate in the exchange of 
information on vessels engaged in or supporting IUU fishing‖422 Most RFMOs have a 
‗blacklist‘.423 The ICCAT blacklist documents vessel‘s Serial Number, Lloyds/IMO Number, 
Name of Vessel (Latin), Current Flag, Owner Name, Owner Address, Owner Place Registration, 
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Operator Name, Operator Address, Radio Call Sign, Date Included on the List.424  Also some 
RFMOs such as ICCAT apply reverse logic and have adopted a ―white list‖ system, where only 
fishing vessels that are on the list are authorised to fish in the Convention waters.425 
The exchange of the above information makes it difficult for non-compliant vessels to reflag to 
an FOC or ‗flag-hop‘, because both flag states and port states know the ‗real‘ flag.426 Freestone 
acknowledges the unreliability of databases (and the data),427 for instance in New Zealand much 
of IUU intelligence is gathered by other ships. However despite this, the unsuccessful injunction 
to preclude the sharing of IUU evidence with CCAMLR and the vessel‘s flag state sought by the 
Namibian vessel Paloma V in the New Zealand High Court is evidence of how far a state will go 
to prevent its inclusion on a blacklist.428 
However PSM alone are not sufficient to curb IUU fishing – international cooperation is 
necessary in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the identification of non-complying 
vessels. The development of port state control at regional level has been discussed since 2000 in 
several international fora.429 
 
In Rome in September 2004 a draft MOU called Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing was presented at the Technical Consultation on Port State 
Measures.430 At the 26th session of COFI in 2006, COFI endorsed the Model Scheme on Port 
State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing, which recommends international minimum standards 
for PSM, requiring appropriate implementation at the regional or national level. 431 In 2007 COFI 
acknowledged the urgent need for a comprehensive suite of PSM to combat IUU fishing, and in 
2007 heard the global call for a binding agreement on PSM based on the Model Scheme and the 
IPOA-IUU. The Port Sate Measures Agreement (PSMA) was approved by the FAO Conference 
at its Thirty-sixth Session on 22 November 2009.432 
 
The PSMA empowers port states to prevent illegally caught fish from entering international 
markets through their ports. Under the terms of the Agreement, foreign vessels will provide 
advance notice and request permission for port entry and as a condition of entry will submit to 
regular inspections in accordance with universal minimum standards that are set out in the 
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Agreement. Under the Agreement vessels that have engaged in IUU activities will be ―denied use 
of port or certain port services and information sharing networks will be created.‖433 
 
Furthermore in the market place, in the context of normal industry and commerce, customers 
are increasingly demanding information on origin. 434 The implementation of schemes such as the 
CDS offers the additional advantage that data and information can be collected by RFMOs, and 
passed on to the discerning consumer. Furthermore this type of information can be particularly 
useful in identifying major markets and trade flows.435 In addition to this with the continued 
proliferation of IUU activity some RFMOS have even pursued the possibility of introducing 
trade embargoes on the harvest of fish from certain origins. 436  
 
PSMs although not without criticism are arguably much more cost effective than pursuing IUU 
fishing vessels on the high seas.437  What is clear is that as long as the IUU fishing pays, and IUU 
fishers have no risk of real sanction, IUU fishing activities will continue to be extremely difficult 
to completely eliminate.438 In the meantime, PMS will continue to knock away at IUU fishing 
profitability, by eliminating or at least decreasing the opportunity to land IUU Fish. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
From the 16th Century States have been well aware of the susceptibility of fish to overfishing.439 
Furthermore this susceptibility of Marine biodiversity to overfishing and over-harvesting came to 
a head in the 1970s with the publication of many reports illustrating the sad state of affairs of the 
high seas fisheries, many of which directly applied Hardin‘s tragedy of commons.440 This period 
ushered in a new period of international co-operation with the appearance of RFMOs who were 
charged with spreading the conservation message and with managing fish stocks.441 Arguably it is 
this new awareness of the fragility of the high seas biota to fishing that prompted the inclusion 
into UNCLOS of this new normative framework that urged states to co-operate in the 
management in high seas fishstocks and to adhere conservation measures set by RFMOs.442  
Yet it is a central premise of this thesis that it is at this normative juncture that the regime that 
resulted from the codification of the Law of the Sea in UNCLOS, became unable to regulate the 
high seas because of two foundational principles of high seas regime; the principle of exclusive flag 
state jurisdiction over vessels of high seas flying the flag of the flag state, and the freedom of fishing (and of 
navigation) on the high seas. These widely accepted historic norms represented obstacles to any 
meaningful governance over high seas resources both directly and indirectly.  
It is the contention of this thesis that the idea of a free sea for fishing that is promulgated in 
UNCLOS, as a concept today is obsolete.443 It is my opinion the United Nations Convention on 
Law of the Sea is an incredible convention and it is regarded by many as a triumph of 
international co-operation – and in many contexts its regulation and foresight is impressive. It 
took years and years of intense negotiation and renegotiation to become a formal instrument of 
International law. However, arguably, in the context of High Seas fisheries and the management 
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks; UNCLOS has shown itself to be wanting. 
This thesis has outlined the ways by which in the context of sustainable management of 
fishstocks on the high seas, the regime set up by UNCLOS is inadequate. For example 
UNCLOS does not allow for any punitive measures for the breach of any RFMO management 
provision or engaging in IUU fishing. In the content of the high seas, the right to inspect a ship, 
even if that ship is suspected to be engaging in IUU Fishing is limited to five grounds; none of 
the grounds have anything to do with fishing;444 
―[No ship] justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: 
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
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(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under 
article 109; 
(d) the ship is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the 
warship.‖ 
We have already ascertained that UNCLOS has declared freedom to fish the high seas the high 
seas, subject only to a duty to conserve fishstocks – which UNCLOS has left to the flag state to 
police; and which ITLOS in the M/V Saiga Case confirmed.  When it comes to International 
Fisheries on the High Seas, flag state responsibility has according to Goodman become; 445  
―the subject of an almost entirely different regime, where attention is centred on the responsible flag State as the key 
panacea for combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and where the concept of flag State 
responsibility itself is still evolving.‖  
This new regime continues to be plagued with the same lacuna due to the robust ‗Grotius freedoms‘ 
posited in the UNCLOS high seas fisheries regime. Now fishstocks are a fraction of what they 
once were, and others approach imminent collapse – and still the international high seas fisheries 
regime lacks the real ‗weaponry‘ to combat rather simple issues like the need for a ‗genuine link‘ 
between the vessel and its flag State;446 combating ‗flags of convenience and open registries for 
fishing vessels. Instead actors have to rely on the responsibility of the flag state. And what are the 
criteria for a responsible flag State? Goodman asks the important question – ―whether a system of 
extensive flag State responsibility is an effective approach, or whether we should be concentrating our efforts on the 
development of complementary controls to assist where flag State jurisdiction fails?‖447 After all as Goodman 
acknowledges; fishing vessels ‗use‘ the marine environment in a different way to other ships448 – 
so perhaps it make sense that the regime that pertains to them reflects that use.  
Hardin saw back in the 60‘s the high seas as a scenario where increasing arrays of vessels are 
chasing a finite number of fishes. In order to overcome a tragedy it is imperative that we develop 
a regime that involves meaningful co-operative and sustainable management, that does more 
than rely an on antiquated normative framework that is built on the assumption that the Seas are 
either property or they are not, and if they are then they are under the controlled of one state to 
the exclusion of others and cease to be free.449 Today in a climate of ever decreasing marine 
biodiversity – the requirement of high Seas actors to regulate in favour of that bio-diversity and 
sustainably manage fishstocks in accordance with a posited antiquated customary normative 
framework that not only perpetuates, but is underpinned by two inconsistent doctrines – is 
ludicrous. 
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It is my contention that although all of these international initiatives are ‗hobbled‘ by robust 
Grotius norms formalised in UNCLOS, the co-operation of the international community in 
response to what is perceived as a major global ailment, and the formalisation of regimes, 
approaches, plans of action and MOU‘s is not only ground breaking, it is norm making. 
However this is just the beginning. For the interested parties are solution focused, they are aware 
that IUU fishing not only has economic and social effects, but it pays, and so represents a 
disincentive to comply with the rules. In order to combat the different types of IUU fishing 
activities, different responses and widely different actors are involved.450 Therefore States are 
applying a multi-pronged approach to the problem. Not only has the response been legal, it has 
also been political and economic. States have begun to explore ―actions that could be taken to modify 
IUU operators‘ incentives structure by reducing revenues from IUU fishing, increasing the operating costs for IUU 
activities, increasing the capital costs of IUU/FOC vessels, and by increasing the cost of risk of engaging in IUU 
activities.‖451 
 
I am aware that this thesis has painted a somewhat futile picture of international governance over 
the high seas fisheries, given the strength of the Grotius norms that unintentionally protect IUU 
operators from international sanction, and this was my intention. My first chapter illustrated the 
extent of the normative ‗gestation period‘ for high seas norms – where over thousands of years 
they were applied, debated, changed, consented to and re-applied. This thesis showed that norms 
like freedom of fishing on the high seas and exclusive flag state jurisdiction were not created in a 
vacuum, but through the process of international relations that stretches back to Pax Romana and 
Roman legal doctrines of property like res communis and res nullius. They are a culmination of 
battles, negotiations and punctuated academic equilibria. Today those norms that govern 
international relations on the high seas that pertain to fisheries, sit posited in UNCLOS; 
cumbersome, and inadaptable; the result of a path dependent normative history that arguably 
serves powerful Coastal states who through the same normative process were able to procure 
200nm of prime fishing waters to the exclusion of all other non-nationals. Newer reactive norms 
like ‗sustainable management, and ‗co-operation‘ through sub-regional fisheries institutions, as 
we have seen are no match for robust and tested international norms of such pedigree. Resulting 
in a tragedy of the high seas commons, beset by illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, flags 
of convenience and the a situation of too many boats chasing too few fish. 
 
Although it was my intention to paint a grim picture of imminent empty oceans, it was not my 
intention, to dwell on the inability for RFMOs and interested states to effectively regulate the 
high seas, what Thompson termed as ‗the pathology of the failures‘.452 I wanted to zero in on the 
response of the international community who armed with a very meagre arsenal: functional 
jurisdiction that consisted of little more than a vague set of ‗conservation and sustainable 
management‘ provisions in UNCLOS and ad hoc regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs), in fewer than twenty years have built a high seas fisheries regime. So this thesis is 
ultimately an optimistic story. A story that charters the course of International high seas fishing 
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States and RFMOs and shows how with meaningful and goal focused ‗international co-operation‘ it is 
possible to turn lemons into lemonade.   
The period between 1993 and 2004 saw the coming into force of a number of international 
instruments (both binding and voluntary) that have laid the normative framework for a new high 
seas fisheries regime. The international community is able to be more goals focussed than ever 
before. In my opinion this is revolutionary – furthermore this unprecedented normative 
‗entrepreneurialism‘ has had the effect of turning the accepted ‗normative gestation period‘ on its 
head – now with better communicative technology, increased opportunity to co-operate, more 
international contact, an increased internationalised learned population, market interdependency, 
globalisation and also ultimately the importance of a sobering international problem at hand, the 
normative gestation period is a fraction of what it used to be. Practices like the precautionary 
approach is now the accepted mode d‘emploi, the application of ILO and IMO practices to high 
seas fisheries to address FOCs are now the norm and most importantly in the context of high 
seas fisheries management, there is now a concept of responsible flag state conduct and a 
concept of what is required to facilitate effective high seas management. 
 
Yet the problem of the tragedy of the high seas commons is still far from being successfully 
addressed – IUU fishing continues to be a worldwide problem, that is ―harmful to current global fish 
stocks and undermines the effectiveness of measures adopted nationally, regionally and internationally to secure and 
rebuild fish stocks for the future.‖453 Yet the international community has shown that multiple 
possibilities exist to address the multiple roots of the problem. Some responses rely on the 
national legal framework; others rely on international frameworks, as is the case with RFMOs,454 
but virtually all understand that high seas governance requires a multi-faceted approach. Indeed 
this was noted at the close of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Workshop on IUU fishing in April 2004.455 Such an approach must include robust port state 
measures that are widely and consistently applied, that embrace and utilise the principle of flag 
state jurisdiction and that address the drivers of IUU fishing, especially the market for poached 
fish.456 And yet at the same time, take into account and address the economic and nutritional 
needs of fishing communities.457 
One interesting avenue is the excursion into Port State Measures (PSM) as a useful tool to 
combat IUU fishing.458 PSM were first implemented in the two soft law instruments: The 1995 
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the 2001 FAO International Plan of Action on IUU 
fishing. But have later become more formalised and now feature in the PSMA an instrument 
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which is binding of its signatories. All of these instruments rely on the premise that Port States 
have Jurisdiction over their ports.459 According to the FAO460, Port States frequently enact 
provisions requiring fishing vessels that enter their ports to hold licenses or to comply with other 
National Port State Measures that would typically include requirements related to prior 
notification of port entry, use of designated ports, restrictions on port entry and 
landing/transhipment of fish, restrictions on supplies and services, documentation requirements 
and port inspections, as well as related measures, such as IUU vessel listing, trade-related 
measures and sanctions.461 Another interesting avenue that is currently being explored that serves 
to dis-incentivise IUU fishing by removing the lucrative economic component of the practice, is 
trade measures and consumer campaigns – ultimately the consumer is the final destination of 
poached fish, and when they become concerned about the journey of a fish from the sea to their 
plate – the rationale is that the engagement of fishers in the practice of IUU fishing will no 
longer be sustainable 
In the management of high seas fisheries and the combat of IUU fishing, in the face of the lack 
of enforcement jurisdiction over 3rd states and FOCs. Miller identified two possible approaches 
open to RFMOs: 462 
1. ―Ignore IUU fishing until stocks become self-regulating (i.e. fishing is no longer sustainable); or 
2. Improve current, and develop new, initiatives to combat IUU fishing.‖ 
 
Option 1 is not tenable not only because it is ―contrary to current best practice‖ and is not 
sanctioned by international law, but also because it could result in irreversible marine ecosystem 
collapse and the extinction of certain species of fish. Option 2 is really the only option open to 
RFMOs.  Stokke and Vidas point out that contemporary high seas fisheries management needs 
to implement measures that are designed to combat IUU operations in three segments;463 
1. Fishing States and RFMOs need to address fishing vessel activity, from vessel registration to the point of 
landing of fish at a port. This is what Stokke and Vidas term ―the international segment ‗at sea‘, which corresponds 
largely to what is understood as IUU fishing.‖ 
2. Fishing States and RFMOs need to address ―the logistical aspect of an IUU operation addresses the organisation of 
supplies and services, and is largely played out in a transnational sphere.‖ Stokke and Vidas argue that it is in this 
flexibility that the strength of IUU operation is to be found.   
3. Fishing States and RFMOs need to address the income flows and net income of IUU operations, which is 
what Stokke and Vidas term the ―catch/product in international trade and market‖. 
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Furthermore, effective high seas management actors must be able to ‗to cut across those three 
segments.‘464 This approach to the containment of IUU fishing is consistent with the 
recommendation of the IPOA-IUU which states;465 
―States should embrace measures building on the primary responsibility of the flag State and using all available 
jurisdictions in accordance with international law, including port State measures, coastal State measures, market-related 
measures and measures to ensure that nationals do not support or engage in IUU fishing.‖ 
Haward argues that despite ―the broadening of ocean governance through the development and entry into force 
of hard law instruments and soft law agreements, the effectiveness of governance remains unclear, while key distant 
water fishing states reject key provisions of UNFSA.‖ This point is shared by New Zealand who stated 
in a speech on subsidies to the WTO;466  
―There remains a very significant gap between international commitments and their implementation. Budgetary 
constraints and insufficient human institutional capacity present obstacles that are compounded by the lack of political 
will to undertake difficult but necessary policy reforms. At the national level, better integration among relevant 
government agencies is widely needed.‖ 
Yet HSTF points out that the ―cumulative effect of these instruments has undoubtedly been to change the 
nature and the location of grossly unsustainable high seas fishing, they have not stopped it.‖467 It will take time 
to win the war on IUU fishing, for there is no one single solution that will serve to eliminate its 
practice.468 But in the meantime, the international community and RFMOs alike have shown 
unequivocally that they are not only up for the challenge, they are in for the good fight – for they 
are not just in it for the fish – they are also in it for the people. 
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ANNEX I – UNCLOS ARTICLES THAT PERTAIN TO 
FISHING ON THE HIGH SEAS469 
 
PART V EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
 
Article 55 Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone 
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific 
legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the 
rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. 
 
Article 56 Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the Coastal State in the exclusive 
economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the 
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of 
the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation 
and exploration of the zone, such as the 
(b) production of energy from the water, currents and winds; jurisdiction as provided for in the 
relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic 
zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act 
in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in 
accordance with Part VI. 
 
Article 57 Breadth of the exclusive economic zone 
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
 
Article 58 Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the 
relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and 
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft 
and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic 
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall 
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the 
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provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part. 
 
Article 62 Utilization of the living resources 
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the 
exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. 
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable 
catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, 
laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the 
allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in 
relation to the developing States mentioned therein. 
3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the coastal State 
shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the living 
resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national interests, 
the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the requirements of developing States in the subregion or 
region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States 
whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in 
research and identification of stocks. 
4. Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with the conservation 
measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations of the 
coastal State. These laws and regulations shall be consistent with this Convention and may relate, 
inter alia, to the following: 
(a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, including payment of fees and other 
forms of remuneration which, in the case of developing coastal States, may consist of 
adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and technology relating to the 
fishing industry; 
(b) determining the species which may be caught, and fixing quotas of catch, whether in 
relation to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per vessel over a period of time or 
to the catch by nationals of any State during a specified period; 
(c) regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and amount of gear, and the 
types, sizes and number of fishing vessels that may be used; 
(d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be caught;  
(e) specifying information required of fishing vessels, including catch and effort statistics and 
vessel position reports; 
(f) requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal State, the conduct of 
specified fisheries research programmes and regulating the conduct of such research, 
including the sampling of catches, disposition of samples and reporting of associated 
scientific data; 
(g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by the coastal State; 
(h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the ports of the coastal State; 
(i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other cooperative arrangements; 
(j) requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries technology, 
including enhancement of the coastal State's capability of undertaking fisheries research; 
(k) enforcement procedures. 
5. Coastal States shall give due notice of conservation and management laws and regulations. 
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Article 63 Stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more 
coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond 
and adjacent to it 
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic zones of 
two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or through appropriate 
subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and 
ensure the conservation and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of 
this Part. 
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive economic zone 
and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the States fishing for such 
stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional 
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the 
adjacent area. 
 
Article 64 Highly migratory species 
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly migratory 
species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum 
utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic 
zone. In regions for which no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State and 
other States whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an 
organization and participate in its work. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply in addition to the other provisions of this Part. 
 
Article 65 Marine mammals  
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an international 
organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more 
strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine 
mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate international 
organizations for their conservation, management and study. 
 
Article 66 Anadromous stocks 
1. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest in and 
responsibility for such stocks. 
2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by the establishment of 
appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters landward of the outer limits of its 
exclusive economic zone and for fishing provided for in paragraph 3(b). The State of origin may, 
after consultations with the other States referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 fishing these stocks, 
establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in its rivers. 
3.  Fisheries for anadromous stocks 
(a) shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive economic 
zones, except in cases where this provision would result in economic dislocation for a 
State other than the State of origin. With respect to such fishing beyond the outer limits 
of the exclusive economic zone, States concerned shall maintain consultations with a view 
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to achieving agreement on terms and conditions of such fishing giving due regard to the 
conservation requirements and the needs of the State of origin in respect of these stocks. 
(b) The State of origin shall cooperate in minimizing economic dislocation in such other 
States fishing these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and the mode of 
operations of such States, and all the areas in which such fishing has occurred. 
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement with the State of origin 
in measures to renew anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for that purpose, 
shall be given special consideration by the State of origin in the harvesting of stocks 
originating in its rivers. 
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond the exclusive economic 
zone shall be by agreement between the State of origin and the other States concerned. 
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landward of the outer limits 
of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of origin, such State shall cooperate 
with the State of origin with regard to the conservation and management of such stocks. 
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these stocks shall make 
arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this article, where appropriate, through 
regional organizations. 
 
Article 67 Catadromous species 
1. A coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their life cycle shall 
have responsibility for the management of these species and shall ensure the ingress and egress of 
migrating fish. 
2.  Harvesting of catadromous species shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits 
of exclusive economic zones. When conducted in exclusive economic zones, harvesting shall be 
subject to this article and the other provisions of this Convention concerning fishing in these zones. 
3. In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the exclusive economic zone of another State, 
whether as juvenile or maturing fish, the management, including harvesting, of such fish shall be 
regulated by agreement between the State mentioned in paragraph 1 and the other State concerned. 
Such agreement shall ensure the rational management of the species and take into account the 
responsibilities of the State mentioned in paragraph 1 for the maintenance of these species. 
 
Article 68 Sedentary species 
This Part does not apply to sedentary species as defined in article 77, paragraph 4. 
 
Article 73 Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State 
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and 
manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including 
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with 
the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention. 
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or 
other security. 
3.  Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic 
zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States 
concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment. 
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4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly notify the flag 
State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently 
imposed. 
 
PART VII HIGH SEAS 
 
SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 86 Application of the provisions of this Part 
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic 
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an 
archipelagic State. This article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the 
exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58. 
 
Article 87 - Freedom of the high seas 
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high 
seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of 
international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: 
(a) freedom of navigation;  
(b) freedom of overflight; 
(c)  freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under 
international law, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other 
States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the 
rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. 
Article 88 Reservation of the high seas for peaceful purposes 
The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes. 
 
Article 89 Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas 
No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. 
 
Article 90 Right of navigation 
Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas. 
 
Article 91 Nationality of ships 
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of 
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose 
flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. 
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that 
effect. 
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Article 92 - Status of ships 
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided 
for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on 
the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the 
case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry 
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, may 
not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be 
assimilated to a ship without nationality. 
 
Article 94 - Duties of the flag State 
1. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters over ships flying its flag. 
2. In particular every State shall: 
(a) maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships flying its flag, 
except those which are excluded from generally accepted international regulations on 
account of their small size; and 
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master, 
officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning the 
ship. 
3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea 
with regard, inter alia, to: 
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking into account the 
applicable international instruments; 
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions. 
4. Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure: 
(a) that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate intervals, is surveyed by a 
qualified surveyor of ships, and has on board such charts, nautical publications and 
navigational equipment and instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the 
ship; 
(b) that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess appropriate 
qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, communications and marine 
engineering, and that the crew is appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type, size, 
machinery and equipment of the ship; 
(c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with 
and required to observe the applicable international regulations concerning the safety of life 
at sea, the prevention of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, 
and the maintenance of communications by radio. 
5. In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is required to conform to 
generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps which 
may be necessary to secure their observance. 
6. A State which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship 
have not been exercised may report the facts to the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag 
State shall investigate the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the 
situation. 
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7. Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably qualified person or persons into 
every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and 
causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals of another State or serious damage to ships or 
installations of another State or to the marine environment. The flag State and the other State shall 
cooperate in the conduct of any inquiry held by that other State into any such marine casualty or 
incident of navigation. 
 
Article 110 Right of visit 
2. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which 
encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in 
accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground 
for suspecting that: 
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has 
jurisdiction under article 109; 
(d) the ship is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same 
nationality as the warship. 
3. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly 
its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If 
suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination 
on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration. 
4. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any 
act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained. 
5. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. 
6. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked and 
identifiable as being on government service. 
 
Article 111 Right of hot pursuit 
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal 
State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. 
Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal 
waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and 
may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been 
interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or 
the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within 
the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined 
in article 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the 
protection of which the zone was established. 
2. The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone 
or on the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws 
and regulations of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the exclusive 
economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones. 
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3. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own 
State or of a third State. 
4. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such 
practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft 
working as a team and using the ship case may be, within the contiguous zone or the exclusive 
economic zone or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or 
auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the 
foreign ship. 
5. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or 
aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that 
effect. 
6. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft: 
(a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis; 
(b) the aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue the ship until a ship or 
another aircraft of the coastal State, summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the 
pursuit, unless the aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not suffice to justify an 
arrest outside the territorial sea that the ship was merely sighted by the aircraft as an 
offender or suspected offender, if it was not both ordered to stop and pursued by the 
aircraft itself or other aircraft or ships which continue the pursuit without interruption. 
7. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction of a State and escorted to a port of that State 
for the purposes of an inquiry before the competent authorities may not be claimed solely on the 
ground that the ship, in the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of the exclusive 
economic zone or the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this necessary. 
8. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested outside the territorial sea in circumstances which do not 
justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that 
may have been thereby sustained. 
 
SECTION 2. CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE LIVING 
RESOURCES OF THE HIGH SEAS 
 
Article 116 - Right to fish on the high seas 
All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: 
(a) their treaty obligations; 
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, 
in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67; and 
(c) the provisions of this section. 
 
Article 117 - Duty of States to adopt with respect to their nationals measures 
for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas 
All States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for 
their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high 
seas.‖ 
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Article 118 - Cooperation of States in the conservation and management of 
living resources 
States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living resources in the 
areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different living 
resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures 
necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate 
to establish sub-regional or regional fisheries organizations to this end. 
 
Article 119 - Conservation of the living resources of the high seas 
1. In determining the allowable catch and establishing other conservation measures for the living 
resources in the high seas, States shall: 
(a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the States 
concerned, to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce 
the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, 
including the special requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing 
patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international 
minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or global; 
(b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested 
species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent 
species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. 
2. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant to the 
conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent 
international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, where appropriate and with 
participation by all States concerned. 
3. States concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and their implementation do not 
discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State.‖ 
 
Article 120 Marine mammals 
Article 65 also applies to the conservation and management of marine mammals in the high seas. 
 
Article 197 Cooperation on a global or regional basis 
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through 
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, 
standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional 
features. 
 
Article 309 Reservations and exceptions 
No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other 
articles of this Convention. 
 
Article 310 Declarations and statements 
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from 
making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the 
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harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that 
such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the 
provisions of this Convention in their application to that State. 
 
Article 311 Relation to other conventions and international agreements 
1. This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the 
Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958. 
2. This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from 
other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by 
other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this 
Convention. 
3. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the operation of 
provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the relations between them, provided that 
such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such 
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles embodied herein, and that the 
provisions of such agreements do not affect the  enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights 
or the performance of their obligations under this Convention. 
4. States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in paragraph 3 shall notify the 
other States Parties through the depositary of this Convention of their intention to conclude the 
agreement and of the modification or suspension for which it provides. 
5. This article does not affect international agreements expressly permitted or preserved by other 
articles of this Convention. 
6. States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the basic principle relating to the 
common heritage of mankind set forth in article 136 and that they shall not be party to any 
agreement in derogation thereof. 
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ANNEX II – LIST OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES470 
 
1. Albacore tuna: Thunnus alalunga. 
2. Bluefin tuna: Thunnus thynnus. 
3. Bigeye tuna: Thunnus obesus. 
4. Skipjack tuna: Katsuwonus pelamis. 
5. Yellowfin tuna: Thunnus albacares. 
6. Blackfin tuna: Thunnus atlanticus. 
7. Little tuna: Euthynnus alletteratus; Euthynnus affinis. 
8. Southern bluefin tuna: Thunnus maccoyii. 
9. Frigate mackerel: Auxis thazard; Auxis rochei. 
10. Pomfrets: Family Bramidae. 
11. Marlins: Tetrapturus angustirostris; Tetrapturus belone; Tetrapturus pfluegeri; Tetrapturus 
albidus; Tetrapturus audax; Tetrapturus georgei; Makaira mazara; Makaira indica; 
Makaira nigricans. 
12. Sail-fishes: Istiophorus platypterus; Istiophorus albicans. 
13. Swordfish: Xiphias gladius. 
14. Sauries: Scomberesox saurus; Cololabis saira; Cololabis adocetus; Scomberesox saurus 
scombroides. 
15. Dolphin: Coryphaena hippurus; Coryphaena equiselis. 
16. Oceanic sharks: Hexanchus griseus; Cetorhinus maximus; Family Alopiidae; Rhincodon 
typus; Family Carcharhinidae; Family Sphyrnidae; Family Isurida. 
17. Cetaceans: Family Physeteridae; Family Balaenopteridae; Family Balaenidae; Family 
Eschrichtiidae; Family Monodontidae; Family Ziphiidae; Family Delphinidae. 
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